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Home Is Where the Hurt Is:
Forum Non Conveniens and Antitrust
by Jeremy C. Batest

In 1996 a Netherlands Antilles corporation specializing in
currency exchange, along with its New York affiliate, sued two
English banks in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York, alleging that the banks had conspired to deprive the
currency exchanger of banking services.1 The banks moved for
dismissal for forum non conveniens,2 which the district court
granted.3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, noting that most of the allegedly anticompetitive conduct took place in England4 and that the true
parties were English.5 In affirming, the Scond Circuit split with
the Fifth Circuit 6 and became the first court of appeals to uphold
applying forum non conveniens to dismiss an international antitrust suit.7
The circuits' disagreement arose out of tensions between
principles of civil procedure and antitrust jurisprudence long established by the Supreme Court. In procedure, the Court has held
t A.B. 1991, Harvard College; J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Chicago.
1 See Capital Currency Exchange, NV v Natl Westminster Bank PLC, 155 F3d 603,
605 (2d Cir 1998), cert denied, 526 US 1067 (1999).
2 Literally, "the forum not being appropriate." The term may be a nineteenth-century
neo-Latinism. See Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient FederalForum, 60 Harv L Rev 908,
909 (1947) (tracing the doctrine as "forum non competens" to early Scottish cases, but
suggesting that the term "forum non conveniens" arose much later).
3 See Capital Currency Exchange, 155 F3d at 606. The ruling, or memorandum endorsement, in Capital Currency Exchange, NV v Natl Westminster Bank PLC, No 96 Civ
6465 (S D NY 1997), is unreported. Capital Currency Exchange, No 98-1308 (US S Ct),
petition for cert at 1 (Feb 1999) [on file with U Chi Legal F]. The petition for certiorari
includes the memorandum endorsement. Id at 18a-22a.
4 See Capital Currency Exchange, 155 F3d at 612 ("[A]t bottom, this is a suit about
two English banks' refusal to do business in England with CCE and Chequepoint UK").
5 See id ("[T]he real parties in interest are foreign corporations.").
6 Compare Capital Currency Exchange, 155 F3d at 608-09 (affirming forum non
conveniens dismissal of international antitrust suit), with IndustrialInvestment Development Corp v Mitsui & Co, 671 F2d 876, 890-91 (5th Cir 1982) (holding forum non conveniens inapplicable in antitrust context), revd on other grounds, 460 US 1007 (1983).
7 See Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 21:27 at 2146 (West 3d ed 1998) (describing Capital Currency Exchange as "the first successful use of
forum non conveniens in an antitrust case").
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that courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction in certain cases,

such as when a more convenient foreign forum exists.' Yet in antitrust the Court has concluded that Congress intended the Clayton Act's special remedies9 to further antitrust enforcement.1 °
Which, then, should prevail: the interests of justice and convenience of parties, or the public interest in international antitrust
safeguards?
This Comment concludes that the public interest in international antitrust enforcement should take precedence. Part I of the
Comment sketches the development of forum non conveniens;
§ 12 of the Clayton Act, which creates special venue rules for antitrust cases;1 and the general transfer statute, 28 USC
§ 1404(a).12 Part II summarizes the relevant case law and contrasts the positions of the Second and Fifth Circuits. Part III asserts that precedent; text, history, context and construction; and
congressional policy underlying the Clayton Act all bar courts
from applying forum non conveniens to dismiss international antitrust cases. Part IV limns antitrust without forum non conveniens.
I. THE RULES IN TENSION: FORUM NON CONVENIENS,

§ 12

OF THE CLAYTON ACT, AND 28 USC

§

1404(A)

In disagreeing over forum non conveniens in antitrust, the
circuits parted company where three legal doctrines intersect.
First, the common-law abstention doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court to dismiss cases over which it has jurisdiction. 3 Second, § 12 of the Clayton Act, a special corporate venue
provision, grants antitrust plaintiffs a broad choice of forum in
which to sue. 4 Third, 28 USC § 1404(a), the general transfer provision, enables district courts to transfer cases to each other for

8 See Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert, 330 US 501, 504-07 (1947) (recognizing forum non

conveniens and collecting cases applying the doctrine).
9 See 15 USC § 15(a) (1994) (enabling private plaintiffs to recover treble damages);
15 USC § 26 (1994 & Supp 1998) (authorizing injunctive relief).
10 See, for example, Zenith Radio Corp v Hazeltine Research, Inc, 395 US 100, 130-31
(1969) ("[Tlhe purpose of giving private parties treble-damage and injunctive remedies
was ... to serve ... the high purpose of enforcing the antitrust laws.").

11 See 15 USC § 22 (1994). A special venue statute supplements the venue rules provided by the general, or broadly applicable, venue statute, 28 USC § 1391 (1994). See
Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 42 at 267 (West 5th ed 1995).
12 28 USC § 1404(a) (1994) (authorizing transfers for justice and convenience).
13 See Gilbert, 330 US at 507.
14 See 15 USC § 22. See also Part I B.
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The common-law doctrine enabled

courts to dismiss cases, § 12 prevented courts from dismissing

antitrust cases, and § 1404(a) permitted courts to transfer domestic antitrust cases. Tracing the development of the doctrine and
statutes reveals the tension among their underlying principles.
A. Forum Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens began as a discretionary Scottish
common-law doctrine that empowered a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over an action when it appeared another court
could try the case more efficiently and fairly. 6 The doctrine crept
slowly into American law. In an early case, Justice John Marshall, in dictum and on policy grounds, asserted that the Supreme Court had discretion to decline to hear an admiralty case
between foreigners. 7 Justice Marshall's reasoning encouraged
other judges to follow suit in admiralty cases, from which courts
8
later extended the doctrine to suits at law.1
The Supreme Court first addressed forum non conveniens in
Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert,9 a tort case, and described the doctrine
as enabling a court to "resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even
when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue
statute." ° The Court enumerated private and public interest fac15 See 28 USC 1404(a).
16 See Paxton Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law,
29 Col L Rev 1, 1-3, 20-30 (1929) (tracing the history of the doctrine). Blair's article
popularized the term "forum non conveniens" among American courts. See Braucher, 60
Harv L Rev at 911-12 (cited in note 2). For a detailed history of the doctrine, see John
Bies, Comment, ConditioningForum Non Conveniens, 67 U Chi L Rev 489, 492-97 (2000).
17 See Mason v Ship Blaireau, 6 US 240, 264 (1804) (suggesting such discretion on
"principles of general policy" rather than on 'any positive incapacity" to hear the case).
18 See Braucher, 60 Harv L Rev at 919 (cited in note 2) ("[lIt was in admiralty cases
...that the federal courts first developed their discretionary power to decline jurisdiction."); id at 921 (describing spread of forum non conveniens to cases at law). See also Bies,
Comment, 67 U Chi L Rev at 496 n 30 (cited in note 16) (collecting cases in admiralty). In
1932 Justice Brandeis noted that courts of law "occasionally decline, in the interest of
justice, to exercise jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens or residents, or where for
kindred reasons the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal."
CanadaMalting Co, Ltd, v PatersonSteamships, Ltd, 285 US 413, 422-23 (1932) ("Obviously, the proposition that a court having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally
true; else the admiralty court could never decline jurisdiction on the ground that the litigation is between foreigners. Nor is it true of courts administering other systems of our
law.").
19 Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert, 330 US 501, 504-09 (1947).
20 Id at 507. But see id at 513-17 (Black dissenting) (urging that in the absence of
explicit legislation, the Court cabin forum non conveniens to equity and admiralty cases).
The Court had earlier discussed forum non conveniens or equivalent principles. See Broderick v Rosner, 294 US 629, 642 (1935) (recognizing the ability of state courts to apply
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tors (the "Gilbert factors") that a trial court must weigh in determining whether to dismiss.2' In a Gilbert analysis, the litigants'
private interests include:
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the
cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to
the action; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.22
The public interest factors include controlling the court's docket,
reducing the burden of jury service for a local community unrelated to the case, trying a case within view of those whose affairs
it touches, holding trial in a forum that knows the applicable law,
and respecting the "local interest in having localized controversies decided at home."" The trial court may dismiss if the factors
weigh heavily in the defendant's favor.24
Although the Gilbert Court approved forum non conveniens,
it did not address whether courts may apply the doctrine to
trump a special venue provision such as § 12 of the Clayton Act,
which provides that
[alny suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws
against a corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
district wherein it may be found or transacts business.25

forum non conveniens and using that name for the doctrine); Anglo-American Provision Co
v Davis Provision Co No 1, 191 US 373, 375 (1903) (acknowledging "general power of a
State to restrict the right of a foreign corporation to sue in its courts").
21 See Gilbert, 330 US at 508-09; see also PiperAircraft v Reyno, 454 US 235, 241 n 6,
247 (1981) (sustaining trial court's grant of forum non conveniens motions, despite applicability of less favorable law in foreign forum); Koster v Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co,
330 US 518, 519 (1947) (holding, in companion case to Gilbert, that the trial court properly
dismissed an insurance policyholder's derivative suit for forum non conveniens).
22 Gilbert, 330 US at 508. The Court included as other possible private interest factors
"the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained," "advantages and obstacles to fair
trial," and whether the plaintiff, by choosing an inconvenient forum, is vexing or harassing the defendant. Id.
23 Id at 508-09.
24 Id at 508 ("But unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.").
25 15 USC § 22.
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One year after Gilbert, in United States v National City Lines
("National City Lines "),26 the Court held that § 12 prohibited
courts from dismissing antitrust cases for forum non
conveniens.27 The Court heavily emphasized the language and
intent of § 12 and reviewed its history at length.28
To the National City Lines I Court, the legislative history of
§ 12 justified depriving federal courts of a means of controlling
their dockets and ridding themselves of suits of marginal venue.
Why did the Court find the legislative history so convincing?29
B. Section 12 of the Clayton Act
Generally, the National City Lines I Court recognized that
Congress wrote the Clayton Act to "mak[e] the nation's antitrust
policy more effective."" Specifically with regard to § 12, the Court
noted that Congress intended to broaden venue.31 This intent-to
strengthen antitrust enforcement by broadening venue-is clear
from the genesis of the Clayton Act, especially from the debate on
its venue provisions. It is no wonder that courts construing those
provisions have read congressional intent expansively.

United States v National City Lines, 334 US 573 (1948) ("National City Lines 1").
Id at 588 ("In face of this [legislative] history, we cannot say that room was left for
judicial discretion to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens so as to deprive the plaintiff of the choice given by the section. That result ... would be utterly inconsistent with
the purpose of Congress."). Justice Jackson, concurring, argued that Congress had provided both special venue for antitrust and special protections against its abuse, obviating
any need for forum non conveniens. Id at 598-99. Because the parties in National City
Lines I were entirely domestic, id at 575 & n 2, courts disagree on its implications for
international antitrust suits. See notes 73-75 and 106-07 and accompanying text.
28 See id at 578-88, especially id at 586 (concluding that Congress intended § 12 "to
aid plaintiffs by giving them a wider choice of venues, and thereby to secure a more effective, because more convenient, enforcement of antitrust provisions").
29 On the current Court, only Justice Scalia opposes using legislative history to interpret unclear text. See, for example, Wisconsin Public Intervenor v Mortier, 501 US 597,
622 (1991) (Scalia, concurring in the judgment) ("[Ultilizing legislative history for the
purpose of giving authoritative content to the meaning of a statutory text ... is the [ I
practice I object to."). In Mortier itself, the eight other Justices then sitting disagreed. See
id at 610 n 4 ("Our precedents demonstrate that the Court's practice of utilizing legislative
history reaches well into its past. We suspect that the practice will likewise reach well into
the future."). Since then, Justice Thomas has clarified that he too will rely on hearings
and a committee report in a doubtful case. See National Credit Union Administration v
FirstNational Bank and Trust Co, 522 US 479, 493 n 6 (1998) ("The legislative history...
supports this conclusion."). For a general discussion, see Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of
Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S Cal L Rev 845 (1992).
30 NationalCity Lines 1, 334 US 573, 581.
31 Id.
26
27
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1. Enactment of § 12.
Before 1914, a plaintiff could file a Sherman Act suit against
a corporation in the district "in which the defendant reside[d] or
[was] found," and could recover threefold the damages sustained
as a result of the defendant's restraint of trade, monopolization of
trade, or trust.3 2 However, underfunded federal enforcement supplied potential private plaintiffs with few ready-made causes of
action, and the Sherman Act's limited scope, combined with several unfavorable court rulings, discouraged private litigation."
The lack of effective private enforcement impelled members
of Congress to encourage private antitrust plaintiffs to sue. 4 After lengthy debate in 1914,"5 Congress passed the Clayton Act,36
which contained several provisions intended to encourage private
enforcement. The Act outlawed practices that, although not
themselves restraints of trade, are preparatory to or concomitant
with such restraints. These forbidden practices include price discrimination,37 exclusive contracts,38 and holding companies or interlocking directorships that permit control of a company by its
competitor. 9 The Act permitted treble damages in suits arising
under these new provisions, 4° and it enabled plaintiffs to seek
injunctive relief 41 Thus, the special corporate venue provision in
§ 12 is but one of several aspects of the Clayton Act that evince a
congressional policy to promote private antitrust enforcement.
This textual inference is confirmed by the legislative history
of the special corporate venue provision, which shows that Congress intended to shorten and to smooth the antitrust plaintiff's
road to the courthouse. Congress strengthened this provision at
nearly every step of the legislative process.
As introduced by Congressman Henry Clayton, his bill would
have enabled an antitrust plaintiff to sue "not only in the judicial
32

Sherman Act, July 2, 1890, ch 647, § 7, 26 Stat 209, 210 (1890); which was super-

seded by Clayton Act, Oct 15, 1914, ch 323, § 4, 38 Stat 731 (1914), codified at 15 USC § 15
(1994); and then repealed by Act of July 7, 1955, ch 283, § 3, 69 Stat 283.
33 See Earl W. Kintner, 2 The Legislative History of the Federal Antitrust Laws and
Related Statutes 990-93 (Chelsea House 1978) (summarizing failure of private enforcement of the Sherman Act).
34 See id at 996-1000 (describing such attempts prior to 1914).
35 See id at 1000-23 (summarizing consideration of the Clayton Act).
36 15 USC §§ 12-27a (1994 & Supp 1998).
37 15 USC § 13 (1994).
38 15 USC § 14 (1994).
39 15 USC § 19 (1994).
40 15 USC § 15.
41 15 USC § 26.
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district whereof [a corporate defendant] is an inhabitant, but also
in any district wherein it may be found."4 2 The House Judiciary

Committee report on the bill noted that this provision expanded
on existing law, which permitted "a suit against a corporation...
[to] be brought in the district whereof it [was] an inhabitant."43
Such report language strongly suggests that the Committee intended to broaden the choice of venue for plaintiffs bringing antitrust suits against corporations.
Floor debate on the special venue provision focused on
whether to strengthen it. One congressman broached the possibility in general debate by asking that the House not compel
those who have suffered damages at the hands of a corporation ...to bring suit in the remote State or district of

which the corporation is an inhabitant by virtue of its incorporation therein, having selected that remote State for
its home, while it goes forth in remote sections of the country, and where its greed for unlawful gain willfully disregards the rights of others and boldly sets aside the provisions of the law.44
Several members proposed to broaden venue by amending the
bill's treble damages provision.45 The House then adopted a committee amendment allowing plaintiffs to sue for treble damages
not only where the defendant "resides" or "is found," but also
where the defendant has an "agent."46 When the House turned to
42 HR 15657, 63d Cong, 2d Sess, § 9 (Apr 14, 1914), reprinted in Kintner, 2 Legislative
History at 1084 (cited in note 33).
43 Antitrust Legislation, HR Rep No 627, 63d Cong, 2d Sess 20 (1914), reprinted in
Kintner, 2 Legislative History at 1100 (cited in note 33) (describing the nascent § 12, then
§ 10 of the committee amendment).
44 51 Cong Rec 9190 (May 23, 1914).
45 See 51 Cong Rec 9414-17 (May 28, 1914). For views of amendment supporters, see
id at 9416 (statement of Congressman Cullop) ("I do not want to make a resident of California come to Trenton, N.J., to bring a suit for violation of this law, but I want him to sue
at home in the jurisdiction where the cause of action arose."); id at 9417 (statement of
Congressman Dickinson) ("I give the widest liberty of bringing suits where the damage is
done and where the action arose."); id at 9467 (May 29, 1914) (statement of Congressman
Sumners) ("The philosophy of legislation with regard to this subject should give the venue
at the place wherein the cause of action arises."). The Supreme Court has discussed this
floor debate at length. See National City Lines 1, 334 US 573, 586-88 (1948).
For the value of using statements of individual legislators as guides to statutory
construction, see Norman J. Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48.13 at
355-57 (Clark 5th ed 1992). See also Department of Revenue v ACF Industries, Inc, 510
US 332, 346 (1994) (using statements of three members of the House of Representatives to
confirm apparent meaning).
46 51 Cong Rec 9466-67 (May 29, 1914).
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the special venue provision for antitrust actions against corporations, members agreed without debate to a parallel amendment
permitting suit where the corporation "has an agent."47
. The Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Congressman Edwin Webb, argued that wherever a corporation "may be
found" meant the same thing as wherever it "has an agent.""
This perceived equivalence may explain his willingness to add the
latter language, but it also may explain why the Senate Judiciary
Committee proposed striking out "has an agent" in the special
venue provision and replacing it with "transacts any business."4 9
The Senate Committee may have intended the transacting business test to be broader than the agent test; Chairman Webb had
hinted that there might have been some states where registering
an agent for the service of process was not necessary for a corporation to do business. 0 But the Senate Committee report provided no explanation for the change, 5' and the Senate approved
this committee amendment without debate. 2 In conference, the
House agreed to the Senate amendment with one minor change,
omitting "any" before "business."3
In House debate on the conference report, Chairman Webb
described § 12 as one of the "teeth" of the bill, stating that "we are
liberalizing the procedure in the courts in order to give the individual who is damaged the right to get his damages anywhereanywhere you can catch the offender."' 4 The liberalized venue provision had become one of the bill's chief selling points.
47 51 Cong Rec 9607 (June 1, 1914).
48

Id at 9608 (colloquy between Congressman Fowler and Congressman Webb).

49 HR 15657 as reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 63d Cong 2d Sess

§ 10 (July 22, 1914), reprinted in Kintner, 2 Legislative History at 1762 (cited in note 33).
50 See 51 Cong Rec 9608 (June 1,1914).
51 See Report to Accompany HR 15657, S Rep No 698, 63d Cong, 2d Sess 49 (July 22,
1914), reprinted in Kintner, 2 Legislative History at 1751 (cited in note 33) (stating that
§§ 10 and 11 "relate to the venue and issuance of process in suits arising under the antitrust laws. They are proposed to be amended in certain respects ... but the amendments
require no special explanation here").
52 See 51 Cong Rec 14324 (Aug 27, 1914); HR 15657 with Senate Amendments Numbered, 63d Cong, 2d Sess § 11 (Sept 3, 1914), reprinted in Kintner, 3 Legislative History at
2448 (cited in note 33) (numbering the Senate amendment to § 11 as amendment 54).
53 Report of the Conference Committee, HR Rep No 1168, 63d Cong, 2d Sess 7 (Sept
25, 1914), reprinted in Kintner, 3 Legislative History at 2461 (cited in note 33).
54 51 Cong Rec 16274 (Oct 7, 1914). Statements of legislators in debate receive little
weight in statutory construction, but courts accord more weight to those of the floor manager, committee chairman, or members of the conference committee; Congressman Webb
was all three. See Norman J. Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 48.14 at
361-62 (cited in note 45). See also 51 Cong Rec 16320-21 (Oct 8, 1914) (statement of Congressman Floyd) (describing § 12 as one of the conference report's "teeth"). The House
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2. Judicial application of § 12.
On the strength of this historical evidence, courts construing
§ 12 have taken the view that Congress intended the provision to
facilitate private antitrust suits against corporations and thus to
improve antitrust enforcement. For example, the Supreme Court
held in Eastman Kodak Co of New York v Southern Photo Materials Co55 that § 12 extended federal district courts' reach "so as to
establish the venue of [a private antitrust suit against a corporation] not only, as theretofore, in a district in which the corporation resides or is 'found,' but also in any district in which it
'transacts business'-although neither residing nor 'found'
therein.""s To construe that provision more narrowly, the Court
argued, would make the transaction of business standard redundant of the residence and "may be found" standards.57 Such a construction would also defeat the provision's purpose, which was to
reliev[e] the injured person from the necessity of resorting
for the redress of wrongs committed by a non-resident corporation, to a district, however distant, in which it resides
or may be "found"-often an insuperable obstacle-and
[to] enabl[e] him to institute the suit in a district, frequently that of his own residence, in which the corporation
in fact transacts business. 8
In United States v Scophony Corp of America,59 the Court applied this expansive interpretation of the special venue provision
in an international case.6" Scophony was an English corporation
that sought to produce televisions in New York and to exploit its
patents in the United States." Citing Eastman Kodak with ap-

passed the conference report on a 245-52 vote, 51 Cong Rec 16344 (Oct 8, 1914); the Senate passed the conference report on a 35-24 vote, 51 Cong Rec 16170 (Oct 5, 1914).
55 Eastman Kodak Co of New York v Southern Photo Materials Co, 273 US 359 (1927).
56 Id at 372-73. The facts of this case did not give rise to venue under the Sherman
Act: Eastman Kodak, the defendant, had its residence and principal place of business in
New York, lacked any office, place of business or resident agent in Georgia, and had not
registered there as a nonresident corporation. Id at 370-71. However, the Court held that
Kodak's shipment of products to Georgia for sale, its collection of orders from Georgia
through nonresident salesmen, and its demonstration of products there amounted to the
transaction of business within the meaning of § 12 of the Clayton Act. Id at 372-74.
57 Id at 374.
58 Id at 373-74.
59 United States v Scophony Corp of America, 333 US 795 (1948).
60 See id at 808.
61 See id at 810-12.
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proval,62 the Court held that Scophony had transacted business
sufficient to give rise to venue in New York under § 12 of the
Clayton Act. s" The expansive view of the intent behind § 12, acknowledged in Scophony and Eastman Kodak, remains good
4
6

law.

C. 28 USC § 1404(a)
Despite the acknowledged intent behind § 12, courts today
view § 12 in the shadow of 28 USC § 1404(a), the general transfer
provision, which permits "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," the transfer of "any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been
brought." 5 For example, in United States v National City Lines
("National City Lines I/"),6 6 the Court applied § 1404(a) to domes-

tic antitrust litigation, holding that § 12 notwithstanding,
§ 1404(a) enables courts to invoke forum non conveniens principles and transfer antitrust cases.6 7 Courts disagree on what lessons to draw from this holding for international antitrust cases.
II.

THE CIRCUITS SPLIT

Clearly the general transfer provision of § 1404(a) is not
available if the defendant seeks dismissal in favor of a foreign
forum. A foreign court is not a "district or division" to which an
American court can "transfer" an action. 6s In international litigation generally, absent a special venue provision, courts may still
invoke common-law forum non conveniens69 But in the international antitrust context, the federal courts face a dilemma: does
62 See id at 808 (describing EastmanKodak as a case where "the Court yielded to and
made effective Congress' remedial purpose.... A foreign corporation no longer could come
to a district, perpetrate there the injuries outlawed, and then by retreating ... to its
headquarters defeat or delay the retribution due.").
63 Scophony, 333 US at 818.
64 See, for example, Campos v Ticketmaster Corp, 140 F3d 1166, 1173 (8th Cir 1998)
(applying the "transacts business" standard to reverse the trial court's conclusion that the
defendant's lack of day-to-day control over a subsidiary defeated venue); Tiger Trash v
Browning-FerrisIndustries, Inc, 560 F2d 818, 824 (7th Cir 1977) (holding that defendant's
theory that a parent's loose control over a subsidiary defeated venue in the subsidiary's
state would "thwart the Congressional intent to liberalize the restrictive venue provision
in Section 7 of the Sherman Act by enacting Section 12 of the Clayton Act").
65 28 USC § 1404(a).
66 United States v National City Lines, 337 US 78 (1949) ("NationalCity Lines 11").
67 See id at 80-82, 84 (applying § 1404(a) to antitrust actions).
68 28 USC 1404(a).
69 See Fitzgerald v Westland Marine Corp, 369 F2d 499, 501-02 (2d Cir 1966) (upholding forum non conveniens dismissal of maritime tort action).
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§ 12 require that they hear antitrust actions that courts would
otherwise dismiss under forum non conveniens in favor of a foreign court, or do courts retain the discretion to dismiss? Only the
Fifth and Second Circuits have taken up this question.
A. The Fifth Circuit's View: Mitsui
In the Fifth Circuit case, Industrial Investment Development
Corp v Mitsui & Co,7° a U.S. corporation and its foreign subsidiaries sued an Indonesian corporation, a Japanese corporation,
and the latter's U.S. subsidiary, alleging that the defendants had
frozen the plaintiffs out of the Indonesian lumber market.7' The
court reversed the trial court's forum non conveniens dismissal,
holding that "[the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens
is inapplicable to suits brought under the United States antitrust
laws" and citing National City Lines r 2 for this proposition.73 The
Mitsui court based this holding on Supreme Court precedent,
choice-of-law principles, and congressional policy.
The Fifth Circuit construed National City Lines I as holding
that § 12 of the Clayton Act was a "statutory elimination of judicial discretion concerning where [a] case should be tried." 4 The
Mitsui court took this stance in part because it viewed Congress
as intending that the plaintiff's convenience should generally determine the choice of forum.75 The Mitsui defendants relied on
National City Lines I16 for the principle that forum non conveniens ought to apply to international antitrust suits." But the Fifth
Circuit distinguished that case as involving § 1404(a) transfers
between federal courts, and irrelevant to a dismissal in favor of a
foreign forum.7"
Although the court suggested that National City Lines '
controlled the Mitsui outcome, the court also argued independIndustrialInvestment Development Corp v Mitsui & Co, 671 F2d 876 (5th Cir 1982),
revd on other grounds, 460 US 1007 (1983).
71 See id at 881.
72 National City Lines I, 334 US 573 (1948).
73 Mitsui, 671 F2d at 890. See id at 880-81 for an account of the lower court's ruling.
74 Id at 890.
75 Mitsui, 671 F2d at 890.
76 National City Lines 1I, 337 US 78.
77 Mitsui, 671 F2d at 890 n 18.
78 See id ("The [National City Lines II] Court in no way questioned its earlier holding
[in National City Lines 11 concerning the effect of 15 U.S.C. § 22 on common law forum non
conveniens. Since defendants can point to no statute authorizing dismissal of an action on
forum non conveniens grounds, National City Lines I does not help them in any way.").
79 NationalCity Lines 1, 334 US 573.
70
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ently of precedent. That the plaintiffs sued under the Sherman
Act, the court said, meant they were acting as private attorneys
general in enforcing penal provisions of American law."° Yet a
foreign court applying international law would decline to enforce
such penal provisions.8 1 Thus, "dismissal for forum non conveniens, then, would be the functional equivalent of a decision that
defendants' acts are beyond the reach of the Sherman Act."82
Mitsui is susceptible to a third interpretation, beyond precedent and choice of law. Although the court did not discuss
whether Indonesia had any antitrust law, the Mitsui analysis
was in tension with the holding in PiperAircraft v Reyno" that a
major change in substantive law did not render forum non conveniens unavailable. 4 The Fifth Circuit distinguished Reyno, a
private tort case, by arguing that "a private antitrust suit is conceived as a part of the scheme of enforcement of statutes enacted
to protect United States commerce."8 5 The court thus implied that
this broad congressional purpose barred forum non conveniens in
international antitrust.
Despite some suggestions to the contrary, the Fifth Circuit
has not retreated since Mitsui from either basis for its view that
courts cannot dismiss antitrust cases for forum non conveniens.88
In Kempe v Ocean Drillingand Exploration Co, 7 the Fifth Circuit
explicitly rejected the Second Circuit's view that § 1404 overruled
National City Lines P8 in the international context.8 9 Strangely,
however, the Kempe court then characterized Mitsui as "deny [ing]
dismissal on a very narrow and discrete ground-the impossibility of plaintiffs obtaining any remedy at all for their antitrust80 See Mitsui, 671 F2d at 891 (arguing that the Sherman Act does not create private
obligations but rather criminalizes restraints of trade).

81 Id ("[1it is a well-established principle of international law that '[tlhe Courts of no
country execute the penal laws of another.'"), citing The Antelope, 23 US (10 Wheat) 66,
123 (1825); Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 89 (1971).
82 Mitsui, 671 F2d at 891.
83 PiperAircraft v Reyno, 454 US 235 (1981).
84 See id at 247 ("[A] change in substantive law should ordinarily not be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry."). Despite the Mitsui
court's failure to discuss Indonesian law, the Fifth Circuit later interpreted Mitsui along
Reyno lines, as holding that "to determine Indonesia to be the proper forum... would, in
effect, 'deprive [I [plaintiffs] of any remedy.'" Kempe v Ocean Drillingand Exploration Co,
876 F2d 1138 (5th Cir 1989) (all brackets original), citing Reyno, 454 US at 255.
85 Mitsui, 671 F2d at 891 n 20, citing Reiter v Sonotone Corp, 442 US 330, 342 (1979).
86 See Kempe, 876 F2d at 1142, 1144 (relying on Mitsui for the proposition that courts
cannot dismiss antitrust cases for forum non conveniens).
87 Kempe v Ocean Drillingand ExplorationCo, 876 F2d 1138 (5th Cir 1989).
88 National City Lines I, 334 US 573.
89 See Kempe, 876 F2d at 1144.
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based claims in Indonesia."" This misdescribes Mitsui's dual
holding. 1 The Mitsui decision depended on National City Lines
I,92 and nowhere did the Mitsui court discuss whether Indonesian
law provided antitrust remedies.
Professor Waller argues that the Fifth Circuit has retreated
from its Mitsui holding" because a later Fifth Circuit panel did
not refer to Mitsui in deciding American Rice, Inc v Arkansas Rice
Growers Cooperative Association.94 This argument misinterprets
Rice Growers, where the plaintiff alleged trademark and unfair
competition violations under the Lanham Act.95 The Clayton Act's
special venue provision does not extend to actions under the Lanham Act. 6 Therefore reliance on Mitsui would have been inapposite in a Lanham Act case, and the Rice Growers court correctly
avoided venue issues.97
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit disposed of the Rice Growers
defendant's forum non conveniens argument by summarizing the
factors, emphasizing that the case involved an American plaintiff
alleging that an American defendant had violated American law,
and concluding that "the district court did not abuse its discretion" by denying the motion for dismissal.98 The Rice Growers
court simply ignored any tension between forum non conveniens
and special venue. Rice Growers therefore does not support Professor Waller's contention that the Fifth Circuit has retreated
from Mitsui. The Fifth Circuit and the Second Circuit disagree on

90 See id at 1145.
91 See Mitsui, 671 F2d at 891 n 20 ("In this case, the question is whether [forum non
conveniens] should apply at all."); id at 890-91 ("Even without the authority of National
City Lines [I], we would reach the conclusion that antitrust cases cannot be dismissed on
the ground that a foreign country is a more convenient forum.").
92 See id at 890.
93 See Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 6.17 at 6-52 n 9 (cited in
note 7) ("[Tlhe force of Mitsui is diminished by the Fifth Circuit's subsequent opinion in
the Rice Growers litigation where ...the Fifth Circuit analyzed a forum non conveniens
motion in an antitrust case on the merits without reference to Mitsui.).
94 American Rice, Inc v Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Association, 701 F2d 408
(5th Cir 1983).
95 See American Rice, Inc v Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Assoc, 532 F Supp
1376, 1380 (S D Tex 1982) (describing plaintiffs claims as arising under 15 USC
§§ 1114(1), 1116(a), and 1125(a)).
96 See 15 USC § 22 (authorizing special venue for suits brought "under the antitrust
laws"); 15 USC § 12(a) (1994) (defining "antitrust laws" to exclude the Lanham Act).
97 See Rice Growers, 701 F2d at 408-18.
98 See id at 417.
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whether courts can apply forum non conveniens in antitrust, and
lower courts are choosing between these approaches.9 9
B. The Second Circuit's Analysis: Capital CurrencyExchange
In Capital Currency Exchange, NV v National Westminster
Bank PLC,"' the Second Circuit's riposte to Mitsui, a Netherlands Antilles corporation and its New York affiliate sued two
English banks in the Southern District of New York, alleging
Sherman Act violations.1 ' The Second Circuit gave two reasons
for affirming the district court's forum non conveniens
dismissal.102
The Second Circuit referred to its precedents holding that forum non conveniens trumped other special venue statutes, and
described itself as "bound to follow"013 the view it took in Transunion Corp v Pepsico, °4 a civil RICO case. Transunion described
National City Lines 1105 as "effectively overruled" by enactment of
§ 1404(a).' ° In the Second Circuit, then, National City Lines I
was "no longer good law, even in cases that are not governed by
§ 1404(a)." 7 Furthermore, Mitsui court relied heavily on thenChief Judge Breyer's opinion in Howe v Goldcorp Investments,
Ltd,' s which affirmed the use of forum non conveniens in a securities action despite the applicability of a special venue statute. 10 9
In particular, the court found that "Justice Breyer specifically
rejected the argument that the holding in National City [Lines] I
continues to govern forum non conveniens dismissals.""0
Generally, then, the Second Circuit argued that National
City Lines P" governed domestic cases only and therefore was

99 See, for example, Laker Airways Ltd v Pan American World Airways, 568 F Supp
811, 818 (D DC 1983) ("The Court fully agrees with Mitsui.").
100 Capital Currency Exchange, NV v National Westminster Bank PLC, 155 F3d 603
(2d Cir 1998).
101 Id at 605-06. For a fuller factual account, see text accompanying notes 1-5.
102 Id at 608-09 (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal of private antitrust action).
103

Id at 609.

Transunion Corp v Pepsico, 811 F2d 127 (2d Cir 1987).
1o5 National City Lines I, 34 US 573 (exempting antitrust from forum non conveniens).
106 Transunion, 811 F2d at 130.
107 Capital CurrencyExchange, 155 F3d at 608.
108 Howe v Goldcorp Investments, Ltd, 946 F2d 944 (1st Cir 1991).
109 See id at 945 (affirming dismissal for forum non conveniens of a private securities
law action against a Canadian corporation). For an evaluation of whether the Second
Circuit accurately interpreted Howe, see text accompanying notes 124-33.
110 Capital CurrencyExchange, 155 F3d at 608.
111 National City Lines 1, 334 US 573.
104
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entirely overruled by enactment of § 1404(a), while National City
Lines I112 was ambiguous enough to permit forum non conveniens even in cases where § 1404(a) did not apply."' The court also
sought support for this general contention in Howe." Lastly, the
Second Circuit stated that its precedents compelled the Capital
Currency Exchange result and forced it to reject the Fifth Circuit's reasoning." 5 Assessing the circuit split requires examining
these claims.
III. COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET § 12

TO BAR FORUM NON CONVENIENS
This Comment contends that courts should interpret § 12 to
block courts from dismissing antitrust suits for forum non conveniens. First, the Second Circuit misinterpreted relevant precedent. Second, history does not support any implication that Congress enacted § 1404(a) to provide forum non conveniens in antitrust cases. Third, the text, evolution, and jurisdictional interpretation of the antitrust laws all support a broad reading of § 12, a
reading that gives life to congressional policy favoring antitrust
enforcement.
A. CapitalCurrency Exchange Lacks Foundation in Precedent
Gaping cracks riddle the precedential foundation undergirding Capital Currency Exchange."6 The Second Circuit based its
ruling on a flimsy line of cases involving clearly distinguishable
special venue provisions. The court also leaned heavily on a misinterpretation of a First Circuit case and depended on strained
readings of relevant Supreme Court precedent.
The Second Circuit cases upon which the Capital Currency
Exchange court built, Cruz v Maritime Co of Philippines"7 and
Transunion," s provide little support for the Capital Currency Exchange holding. First, Transunion relied on Cruz for the proposition that forum non conveniens can trump a special venue provi-

National City Lines 11, 337 US 78.
113 See text accompanying notes 134-40.
114 Howe, 946 F2d 944. For a discussion of Howe, see text accompanying notes 130-33.
115 Capital Currency Exchange, 155 F3d at 609.
116 Capital CurrencyExchange, 155 F3d 603 (2d Cir 1998).
117 Cruz v Maritime Co of Philippines,702 F2d 47 (2d Cir 1983).
118 Transunion Corp v Pepsico, 811 F2d 127 (2d Cir 1987).
112
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sion." 9 Yet if Cruz stands for this proposition, it does so only implicitly. While the two-page, per curiam Cruz opinion did con121
2
clude that forum non conveniens could apply ' in a Jones Act
case, nowhere did the court discuss special venue generally 122 or
the Jones Act's special venue provision.'2 3 This silence renders
Cruz dubious authority for the proposition that a special venue
provision permits a forum non conveniens dismissal; there is no
evidence from the Cruz opinion that the parties even briefed the
issue.
2 4 did the Second Circuit
Only later, in Transunion,'
take note
of the Jones Act's special venue provision, which the Cruz opinion
had overlooked. 125 Despite the lacuna in Cruz, and without filling
it by treating the question at any length, the Transunion court
derived from Cruz the rule that forum non conveniens overrides a
special venue statute .12' The court upheld forum non conveniens
dismissal of a civil RICO action, despite an applicable special
127
venue provision that was modeled on antitrust law.
Importantly, the Transunion court acknowledged the
strength of the legislative history behind the Clayton Act's special
venue provision, but argued that the absence of similar history of
the RICO statute justified applying forum non conveniens to
RICO litigation. 12 In using legislative history to distinguish anti-

119 See id at 130 ("[Dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds has been upheld in
many other cases involving statutes with special venue provisions.").
120 Cruz, 702 F2d at 48 (affirming the district court's use of the "equitable principle" of
forum non conveniens to dismiss a seaman's tort action against a Philippine maritime
firm).
121 46 USC § 688 (1994) (creating federAl jurisdiction for suits arising out of certain
acts in American waters).
122 See generally Cruz, 702 F2d 47 (per curiam).
123 46 USC § 688(a).
124 Transunion, 811 F2d 127 (2d Cir 1987) (affirming district court's dismissal for
forum non conveniens of a suit that a Philippine corporation had brought against an
American corporation, alleging RICO violations, fraud, and breach of contract).
125 See id at 130 (noting the special venue provision in the Jones Act).
126 See id (rejecting argument that special venue provision blocked forum non conveniens dismissal).
127 See id. The special venue provision at issue was 18 USC § 1965(a) (1994).
128 See Transunion, 811 F2d at 130:
The decision in National City Lines [I] was based upon a thorough review
of legislative history of the Clayton Act .... A review of the legislative
history of RICO [ ] discloses no mandate that the doctrine of forum non
conveniens should not apply, nor is there any indication that Congress
had the interpretation of 15 U.S.C. § 22 in National City Lines [I] in mind
when it drafted section 1965 of RICO. Indeed, the House Report's reference to "present" antitrust legislation suggests that Congress was aware
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trust from RICO, and to justify using forum non conveniens in
RICO, the Transunion court described the history of § 12 of the
Clayton Act as disclosing "no other thought than that the choice
of forums was given as a matter of right, not as one limited by
judicial discretion." 2 9 Such a view of the Clayton Act would bar
forum non conveniens from antitrust cases. If the Capital Currency Exchange court had correctly followed the Transunion
analysis, the Second and Fifth Circuits would agree.
The Capital Currency Exchange court also found support for
its holding by badly misinterpreting then-Chief Judge Breyer's
opinion in Howe,"' a securities case. The Breyer opinion did
strongly disparage the view that special venue statutes always
operate to deprive courts of forum non conveniens discretion. 3 '
Yet like Transunion,Howe carefully exempted antitrust from this
disparagement. Justice Breyer noted that in National City Lines
I,132 the Supreme Court "relied heavily on the legislative history
of the antitrust statute"-legislative history once again absent
from the special venue provision of securities law at stake in
Howe-and that the "difference [between the legislative history of
the two provisions] is significant." 3' Thus Howe should not control in antitrust, and the Second Circuit erred in citing it.
Lastly, the Capital Currency Exchange court read the National City Lines cases illogically. It interpreted National City
Lines I overly narrowly, as prohibiting domestic forum non conveniens transfers." 4 Yet the defendants in that case moved to
dismiss, not to transfer, as the law then did not permit transfers

that the result in National City Lines [I] was effectively overruled by
Congress in 1948, when it enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The court's understanding of "present" to mean the general transfer statute begs the question of how to interpret National City Lines 1, 334 US 573.
129 Transunion, 811 F2d at 130, quoting National City Lines I, 334 US at 586-87.
130 Howe, 946 F2d 944.
131 Id at 948-50.
132

334 US 573 (1948).

133 Howe, 946 F2d at 948-49. See also id at 949 ("Neither [the general nor the special]

kind of [venue] statute, explicitly or (absent some special legislative intent) implicitly,
prohibits an international transfer [sic].") (emphasis added); id at 944 ("We conclude that
the federal courts possess the power to invoke the forum non conveniens doctrine in a
private action claiming a violation of American anti-fraud securities statutes, as they do in
cases brought under most other federal statutes.") (emphasis added).
134 Capital Currency Exchange, 155 F3d at 606 ("In [National City Lines I], the Supreme Court held that forum non conveniens could not be used to transfer an antitrust
suit to a more convenient forum within the United States.").
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between district courts. 35 Then, as now, to apply forum non conveniens meant to dismiss. Although the case was entirely domestic, the court did not limit its holding to dismissals in favor of
domestic fora,'36 which would have been hard to do, since § 12
does not distinguish between domestic and foreign plaintiffs. 37
Conversely, the Second Circuit read National City Lines I11"s
overly broadly, to reach beyond the domestic ambit of § 1404(a).'39
However, the Court there confined its holding to the domestic
transfer context.140 To stretch this result beyond the narrow domestic transfer context of § 1404(a) strains the text of both the
statute and the Court's opinion.
B. Congress Did Not Enact § 1404(a) Out of Concern
for Foreign Antitrust Defendants
Although by its text § 1404(a) authorizes domestic transfers
and not international dismissals, both the Second and First Cir141
cuits used it to justify their dismissals of international claims.
This reading is dubious: Congress did not enact § 1404(a) either
to cabin American jurisdiction or to shield foreign defendants.

135 See National City Lines I, 334 US at 576-77 (summarizing the defendants' motion
for dismissal and the trial court's grant of it "without prejudice to the institution of a
similar suit" in a more convenient forum).
136 See id at 596-97:

At least one invariable, limiting principle may be stated ....
[WIhenever
Congress has vested courts with jurisdiction to hear and determine
causes and has invested complaining litigants with a right of choice
among them which is inconsistent with the exercise by those courts of
discretionary power to defeat the choice so made, the doctrine [of forum
non conveniens] can have no effect.
See notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
National City Lines 11, 337 US 78.
139 See Capital CurrencyExchange, 155 F3d at 607, quoting National City Lines 11, 337
US at 79:
137
138

Although its decision was based upon § 1404(a), the [National City Lines
II] Court did not explicitly limit its holding to cases governed by
§ 1404(a).... [It] did not distinguish § 1404(a) from the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, noting that the issue before it was
whether § 1404(a) "extends the doctrine of forum non conveniens to antitrust suits."
140
141

National City Lines 11, 337 US at 84 ("We hold that § 1404(a) is applicable here.").
See Capital Currency Exchange, 155 F3d at 609 ("National City II ... did not draw

a bright-line distinction between transfers under § 1404(a) and . . . forum non conveniens."); Howe, 946 F2d at 949 ("[Section] 1404(a)... reflects a congressional policy strongly
favoring transfers.").
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Both circuits have implied that the chronological propinquity
in June 1948 of the National City Lines I opinion4 2 and the enactment of § 1404(a) suggests that Congress responded to the
opinion by passing the statute.'
If Congress had done so, it
might have set a legislative speed record. But the implication
gets the chronology wrong, as a glance at the history shows. 44
Section 1404(a) became law as part of a massive revision and recodification of Title 28 of the United States Code' 45-a recodification that Congress and the private bar had gestated for years. 4 6
The Supreme Court itself has noted the futility of attempting to
14
link the recodification to National City Lines J. 1
In enacting § 1404(a), instead of reacting to National City
Lines I, Congress responded to an entirely domestic federal tort
suit 4 brought under a special venue provision 149 of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act. The report accompanying the recodifica142 334 US 573 (1948).
143 See Capital Currency Exchange, 155 F3d at 607 (observing that § 1404(a) became
law "[iun September 1948, shortly after National City Lines I was decided"); Howe, 946
F2d at 949 (noting that Congress enacted the transfer provision "immediately after" the
Court issued its ruling in National City Lines I, implying a connection between the ruling
and the statute). But see National City Lines 11, 337 US at 82 (explaining the timing);
Mitsui, 671 F2d at 890 n 18 (accurately describing the two as "unrelated").
144 Compare National City Lines 1, 334 US at 573 ("Decided June 7, 1948") and id at
862 (denying rehearing on June 21, 1948) with Act of June 25, 1948, Pub L No 80-773,
ch 646, § 1404(a), 62 Stat 937, codified at 28 USC § 1404(a). The full House debated the
recodification on May 12, 1947, see 93 Cong Rec 5049, and passed it on July 7, 1947, see
93 Cong Rec at 8392; the Senate passed the recodification on June 12, 1948, see 94 Cong
Rec 7927. The district court had issued its opinion in National City Lines I on September
29, 1947. United States v National City Lines, 7 FRD 456, 456 (S D Cal 1947).
145 See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub L No 80-773, 62 Stat 695, A3.
146 See Act of June 28, 1943, 57 Stat 230 (appropriating funds for "preliminary work in
connection with the preparation of a new edition of the United States Code"); see also 93
Cong Rec 5049 (May 12, 1947) (recording House passage of recodification); Revision of
Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code, Hearings on HR 1600 and HR 2055 before
Subcommittee No 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 80th Cong, 1st Sess 29
(1947) (statement of Professor James William Moore) (describing recodification effort); HR
7124 § 1404(a), 79th Cong, 2d Sess (1946) (reported by the House Committee on the Revision of the Laws), cited in Note, The Proposed Revision of the Federal Judicial Code, 60
Harv L Rev 424, 435 (1947). For a thorough discussion of the recodification effort, see Ex
parte Collett, 337 US 55, 61-72 (1948) (tracing the history of § 1404(a)).
147 See Collett, 337 US at 65 ("This was scarcely hasty, ill-considered legislation....
Five years of Congressional attention supports [sic] the [Judicial] Code."); National City
Lines 11, 337 US 78, 82 (1949) ("Clearly, the failure of Congress expressly to consider [National City Lines I] proves nothing.").
148 See Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co v Kepner, 314 US 44, 54 (1941) (holding that the

special venue provision of the Federal Employers' Liability Act "cannot be frustrated for
reasons of convenience or expense").
149 See 45 USC § 56 (1994) ("Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district
court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the
cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of
commencing such action.").
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tion bill cited the tort case as justification for what would become
§ 1404(a)."' This legislative history suggests that Congress did
intend to limit the effect of certain special venue statutes, but
only to provide relief to domestic defendants.151 To permit domestic transfers would have only minimally addressed the plight of
foreign defendants haled into American courts.
Thus § 1404(a) cannot serve as indirect support for applying
forum non conveniens. Section 1404(a) did nothing to impair
§ 12's textual breadth, statutory context, purpose and interpretive history, which direct courts not to dismiss antitrust suits for
forum non conveniens.
C. To Apply Forum Non Conveniens
Ignores Congressional Policy
Section 12 of the Clayton Act evinces in several ways a congressional policy to vest the choice of forum in the plaintiff as "a
matter of right, not as one limited by judicial discretion.""' By its
text 153 and context,5 4 and under most applicable canons of statutory interpretation,'55 § 12 does not admit of qualification. More
generally, courts apply the antitrust statutes extraterritorially."5 '
To dismiss antitrust suits for forum non conveniens would fly in
the face of both a congressional policy that courts have long recognized and a statute that they have broadly interpreted.
160 See House Committee on the Judiciary, Revision of Title 28, United States Code,
HR Rep No 308, 80th Cong, 1st Sess, A132 (1947) (reviser's notes), citing Baltimore &
Ohio Railroad v Kepner, 314 US 44 (1941), and stating that § 1404(a):
was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is
proper. As an example of the need of such a provision, see . .. Kepner,
which was prosecuted under the Federal Employer's [sic] Liability Act in
New York, although the accident occurred and the employee resided in
Ohio.
151 But see Brunette Machine Works, Ltd v Kockum Industries, Inc, 406 US 706, 714
(1972) (holding that the Alien Venue Act, 28 USC § 1391(d), which also debuted in the
1948 recodification, "is properly regarded, not as a venue restriction at all, but rather as a
declaration of the long-established rule that suits against aliens are wholly outside the
operation of all the federal venue laws, general and special"). Brunette would seem to have
implications for interpreting § 12, but neither the Mitsui court nor the Capital Currency
Exchange court discussed it.
152 National City Lines I, 334 US at 586-87 ("There was ... common agreement upon
this among both the advocates and the opponents of [§ 12]. No one suggested that the
courts would have discretionary power to decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred.").
153 See text accompanying notes 157-64.
154 See text accompanying note 165.
155 See text accompanying notes 170-74; but see text accompanying notes 175-78.
156 See text accompanying notes 187-200.
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1. Statutory text and history.
Section 12, read in isolation, presents little ambiguity. It provides special venue for "[a]ny suit, action, or proceeding under the
antitrust laws against a corporation."'5 7 Because dictionaries define "any" broadly, the phrase "any suit" ostensibly would include
suits by foreign plaintiffs.' But courts construe ambiguous language using a canon against extraterritoriality, unless a contrary
intent appears in the statute.'59 Looking at § 12 in isolation, then,
the canon might narrow "any suit" so as to permit courts to dis-

miss foreign plaintiffs' antitrust suits.
But evidence of contrary intent lies close at hand. If § 12
alone is obscure, it becomes plain when considered in conjunction
with other antitrust provisions. They permit "any person" to sue
violators of the antitrust laws, 6 ° and the Clayton and Sherman
Acts both define "person" to include foreign corporations.'61 The
Clayton Act's special venue provision therefore governs suits
brought by foreign plaintiffs."' Similarly, the special venue stat157 15 USC § 22 ("Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a
corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but
also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business.").
158 See James A.H. Murray et al, eds, The Oxford English Dictionary 378 (1933 reprinted 1961) (defining "any" as an "indeterminate derivative of one" that subordinates
the idea of unity "to that of indifference as to the particular one or ones that may be selected" or as "concerning a being or thing of the sort named, without limitation as to
which, and thus constructively of every one of them, since every one may in turn be taken
as a representative"). See also Philip Babcock Cove, ed, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 97 (Merriam-Webster 1986) (defining
"any" first as "one indifferently out of more than two: one or some indiscriminately of
whatever kind" or "one, no matter what one: every," and noting that "any" is used to indicate "one that is not a particular or definite individual of the given category but whichever
one chance may select" and "one that is selected without restriction or limitation of
choice"); Stuart Berg Flexner, ed, The Random House Dictionary of the English Language
96 (2d ed 1987) (defining "any" first as "one, a, an or some; one or more without specification or identification," second as "whatever or whichever it may be," and fourth as "every,
all"); The American Heritage Dictionary 83 (Houghton Mifflin 3d ed 1992) (defining "any"
first as "[olne, some, every, or all without specification").
159 See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v Arabian American Oil Co, 499
US 244, 248, 258 (1991) ("Aramco"), which recast as a clear-statement rule the earlier
presumption against extraterritoriality. That presumption was set forth most fully in
Foley Brothers Inc v Filardo,336 US 281, 285 (1949), citing Blackmer v United States, 284
US 421, 437 (1932) ('The canon of construction which teaches that legislation of Congress,
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States ... is a valid approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent
may be ascertained.").
160 15 USC 15(a).
161 See 15 USC §§ 7, 12(a) (1994) (defining "person" to include "corporations ... existing under or authorized by. . . the laws of any foreign country").
162 Given the explicit inclusion of foreign corporations in "person," see note 161, it
would be incongruous not to understand the term "any person" as implicitly including
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ute does not distinguish between foreign and domestic corporate
defendants. The chief penal provisions of the Sherman Act and
the Clayton Act apply to both.' Section 12 creates special venue
for suits by those injured "by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws."164 Hence special venue lies for suits against foreign corporations.
Construing § 12 to include actions brought either by foreign
plaintiffs or against foreign corporate defendants or both conforms it with broader antitrust provisions. Both the Sherman and
Clayton Acts mention foreign commerce in the same breath as
interstate commerce, often using the constitutional phrase "commerce with foreign nations."'65 Courts agree that in antitrust,
Congress intended to exercise its power over foreign commerce to
the full extent allowed by the Constitution.'66
This view finds support in congressional debate on the Clay-

ton Act-debate which showed that the House of Representatives
knew of the Sherman Act's international impact. Early federal
prosecutions against shipping lines, and one similar private action, had already established that the Sherman Act covered even
restraints of trade formed abroad that operate only partly in the
foreign individuals as well. See Hoffman Motors Corp v Alfa Romeo SpA, 244 F Supp 70,
82 (S D NY 1965) ("It is clear from the Act's definition of 'person' that it applies to individuals as well as corporations.") (citing 15 USC § 12). Consider In re Antibiotic Antitrust
Actions, 333 F Supp 315, 316 (SD NY 1971) (holding the nation of Kuwait to be a "person"
and terming its ability to sue to be "essential to the effective enforcement of the antitrust
laws").
163 See 15 USC § 1 (1994) ("Every person [contracting, combining or conspiring in
restraint of trade] ...shall be deemed guilty of a felony."); 15 USC § 2 (1994) ("Every
person [monopolizing trade] shall be deemed guilty of a felony."); 15 USC § 13(a) ("It shall
be unlawful for any person.., to discriminate in price."); see also note 161.
164 15 USC § 15.
165 See US Const Art I, § 8 cl 1-3 ("The Congress shall have power ...To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations."); 15 USC § 1 (making illegal "every contract, combination ...or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations"); 15 USC § 2 (making monopolization of "any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations" a felony); 15 USC § 3 (1994)
(banning restraints of trade among territories, states, the District of Columbia, and "any
...foreign nations"); 15 USC § 12 (defining "commerce" as used in the Clayton Act to
mean "trade or commerce among the several states and with foreign nations").
166 See Summit Health,Ltd v Pinhas,500 US 322, 329 n 10 (1991) ("It is firmly settled
that when Congress passed the Sherman Act, it 'left no area of its constitutional power
[over commerce] unoccupied.'") (internal citation omitted); Gough v Rossmoor Corp, 487
F2d 373, 375 (9th Cir 1973) (stating that Congress intended to extend the Sherman Act "to
the farthest reaches of its power under the Commerce Clause"); 20 Cong Rec 1167 (Jan 25,
1899) (statement of Senator Sherman) ("[The Sherman Bill] makes such agreements and
combinations unlawful, and it goes as far as the Constitution permits Congress to go.").
But see a non-antitrust case, Aramco, 499 US at 251 ("[W]e have repeatedly held that
even statutes that contain broad language in their definitions of 'commerce' that expressly
refer to 'foreign commerce' do not apply abroad.").
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United States.'6 7 While discussing what would become § 12, a
congressman alerted the House of Representatives to two
Sherman Act suits pending against foreign shipping lines.16 s As
they debated the Clayton Act, therefore, members of the House
knew that foreign corporations were defending themselves in U.S.
fora against antitrust claims.
2: Canons of construction.
Given the statutory evidence, both textualists and historians
might conclude that § 12 bars forum non conveniens entirely. Yet
others may object that Congress cannot have settled the matter
in 1914, particularly since forum non conveniens then was a
nameless, inchoate doctrine most prominent in admiralty. Judges

167 See United States v Pacific and Arctic Railway and Navigation Co, 228 US 87, 89,
90-91, 106 (1913) (reversing trial court's ruling sustaining demurrer and finding that trial
court had jurisdiction over indictment against defendant Canadian Pacific Railroad Company for destroying competition in shipping between Vancouver and Skagway, Alaska).
The Canadian Pacific Railway received its corporate charter from the Dominion of Canada
in 1880. See The Canadian Pacific Railway Charter,1880 <http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/confed/
docs/docOO012.htm> (visited Oct 18, 2000).
See also Thomsen v Union Castle Mail Steam Ship Co, 166 F 251, 253 (2d Cir 1908)
(reversing dismissal of action alleging that one German and several British shipowners
entered into combination in restraint of trade between the United States and South Africa: "That the combination was formed in a foreign country is [ I immaterial."), affd as
Thomsen v Cayser, 243 US 66, 88 (1917) (holding that this combination, though formed
abroad, "affected the foreign commerce of this country and was put into operation here"
and was therefore subject to U.S. antitrust law).
See also United States v Hamburg-AmerikanischePacket-Fahrt-Actien-Gesellschaft,
200 F 806, 806-07 (C C S D NY 1911), dismissed in part as United States v HamburghAmerican Steam Ship Line, 216 F 971 (S D NY 1914), revd on grounds of mootness 239 US
466 (1916), where the trial court stated:

The prohibitions of the anti-trust [sic] statute apply broadly to contracts
in restraint of trade or commerce with foreign nations ....

Citizens of

foreign nations are not free to restrain or monopolize the foreign commerce of this country by entering into combinations abroad nor by employing foreign vessels to effect their purpose.
The defendants in Hamburg-Amerikanische were shipping lines-one American, one Canadian, one Belgian, one Dutch, one Russian, two German, and four British. 239 US at
468-70.
168 See 51 Cong Rec 9416 (May 28, 1914) (statement of Congressman Alexander). In
addition to Hamburg-Amerikanische and Thomsen, Congressman Alexander may have
noticed United States v Prince Line, Ltd, 220 F 230, 232 (S D NY 1915) (alleging that two
British and two German shipping companies had restrained trade between the United
States and Brazil), revd on mootness grounds 242 US 537 (1917). Plaintiffs also alleged
that one German, eight British, and two American steamship lines had combined in restraint of trade between the United States and the Far East. Prince Line, 220 F at 235.
World War I destroyed the shipping cartels alleged in these cases. But an early
treatise acknowledged their import for antitrust's extraterritoriality. See W.W. Thornton,
A Treatise on Combinations in Restraint of Trade § 66 at 177-78 (Anderson 1928).
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skeptical of extraterritoriality'69 might resort to canons of construction. But three general canons support the view that forum
non conveniens should not apply in antitrust cases.
First, courts canonically disfavor implied amendments.1 7
Enactment of § 1404(a) permitted transfers between the district
courts, and thus implicitly amended § 12 by balancing the plantiff's choice of special venue against a defendant's right to transfer to another domestic forum. Textually, however, no amendment balanced a plaintiff's choice of special venue against a defendant's right to transfer to a foreign forum, because § 1404(a)
by its text created no such right.17 1 Therefore, courts should not
construe § 1404(a) as if it did.'
Second, specific provisions of law canonically trump general
ones.'7 3 Thus § 12, which creates special venue for international,
private antitrust actions against corporations, should prevail over
any pro-dismissal penumbra of § 1404(a), a general domestic
transfer provision.
Third, courts canonically avoid creating exemptions not provided for by text, even where there is legislative history demonstrating congressional intent to provide the exemption.'74 The
presumption against creating nontextual exemptions should apply more forcefully to § 12, which lacks any legislative history
suggesting an exemption to special venue in international cases.
One canon may support forum non conveniens in antitrust:
the "rule against congressional curtailment of the judiciary's 'in169 For a discussion of extraterritoriality and antitrust, see Part III C 3.
170 See United States v Welden, 377 US 95, 103 n 12 (1964) ("Amendments by implication, like repeals by implication, are not favored."); Norman J. Singer, 1A Statutes and
Statutory Construction§ 22.13 at 215-17 & n 3 (Clark 5th ed 1994) (collecting cases).
171 But see Norman J. Singer, 3A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 67.04 at 70, 72
& nn 13, 14 (Clark 5th ed 1992) (stating both that "[s]tatutes providing for venue ... are
given a liberal interpretation to avoid unnecessary litigation" and that "statutes authorizing change of venue are liberally construed to assure a fair trial to the parties"). Construction of service of process provisions is normally strict, but "statutes permitting substituted service upon foreign corporations have usually been given a broad interpretation
so that foreign corporations doing business in the state cannot escape process." Id at 70.
172 See Norman J. Singer, 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 53.01 at 229-30
(Clark 5th ed 1992) ("[Cjourts have been said to be under a duty to construe statutes harmoniously where that can reasonably be done.").
173 See Green v Bock Laundry Machinery Co, 490 US 504, 524 (1989) ("A general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is no more specific rule."); Crawford Fitting
Co v J.T. Gibbons, Inc, 482 US 437, 444-45 (1987) ("[W]here there is no clear intention
otherwise, a specific statute will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless
of the priority of enactment.") (citations omitted).
174 See City of Chicago v Environmental Defense Fund, 511 US 328, 337 (1993) (refusing to create an exemption provided for in committee report language, but not in the text
of the statute).
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herent powers."" 75 Among those inherent powers, the Supreme
Court has suggested in dictum, is forum non conveniens. 7 6 But to
regard forum non conveniens as an inherent power in antitrust
would overlook the Gilbert7 7 Court's statement that forum non
conveniens permits courts to dismiss cases that are proper under
general venue statutes.'7 8 The Gilbert Court did not address
whether a court's inherent power to dismiss overrides a special
venue statute. The National City Lines P" Court did, and found
that § 12 trumped courts' inherent powers to dismiss. 8 °
These general canons, however, may not actually do much
work to help a court interpret § 12. It is commonplace to observe
that canons are largely indeterminate. 8 ' For example, one might
argue that § 12 is in derogation of common-law forum non con175 William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court: 1993 TermForeword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev 26, 102 (1994), citing Chambers v
NASCO, Inc, 501 US 32, 43-44 (1991).
176 Chambers, 501 US at 44 ("There are other facets to a federal court's inherent
power ....It may dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens."), citing Gilbert,
330 US at 507-08.
177 Gulf Oil Corp v Gilbert, 330 US 501 (1947).
178 See id at 507 ("The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may
resist imposition upon its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of
a general venue statute.").
179 National City Lines I, 334 US 573.
180 The Court phrased its conclusion in convenience terms:

In adopting § 12 Congress was not willing to give plaintiffs free rein to
haul defendants hither and yon at their caprice. But neither was it willing to allow defendants to hamper or defeat effective enforcement by
claiming immunity to suit in districts where by a course of conduct they
had violated the Act with the resulting outlawed consequences. In framing § 12 to include those districts at the plaintiffs' election, Congress thus
had in mind not only their convenience but also the defendant company's
inconvenience, and fixed the limits within which each could claim advantage in venue and beyond which neither could seek it....
In the face of this history we cannot say that room was left for judicial
discretion to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens so as to deprive
the plaintiff of the choice given by the section. That result .. .would be
utterly inconsistent with the purpose of Congress in conferring the
broader range of choice.
National City Lines I, 334 US at 588 (citation omitted, emphasis added). See also Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co v Kepner, 314 US 44, 54 (1941) ("A privilege of venue, granted
by the legislative body which created this right of action, cannot be frustrated for reasons
of convenience or expense. If it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legislative."); Tivoli Realty
v Interstate Circuit Inc, 167 F2d 155, 158 (5th Cir 1948) ("[Tihe importance of unhampered
commerce was as great as that of the [defendant's] freedom from harassing litigation, and
did not outweigh the plain grant of a legal privilege as to venue.... The general rule is
that a court possessing jurisdiction must exercise it if the venue is properly laid.").
181 See Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules of
Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 Vand L Rev 395, 401 (1950) ("[T]here
are two opposing canons on almost every point.").
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veniens182 and cite the canon that courts should construe such
statutes narrowly. 83 However, the relevant countercanon, that
courts should construe remedial statutes broadly, has an antitrust-specific corollary: exemptions to the antitrust statutes
should be narrowly construed." Not surprisingly, some experts
believe that many canons of construction are simply inaccurate.185
Antitrust provides a salient example of this inaccuracy. The
Supreme Court has held that the traditional canon against applying American law extraterritorially does not pertain to antitrust. 8 6 Antitrust law is exceptional'in its international scope.'87
3. Antitrust's extraterritoriality.
The Supreme Court initially hesitated to apply the antitrust
laws to activity occurring wholly abroad. In 1909 Justice Holmes
wrote that the antitrust laws did not extend to an American corporation's acts that were legal in Panama but that restrained
trade in bananas with the United States.' Yet the Court soon

182 Given the doctrine's history, however, one might well debate whether forum non
conveniens had become part of the common law by 1914. See Part I A.
183 See generally Jefferson B. Fordham and J. Russell Leach, Interpretationof Statutes
in Derogationof the Common Law, 3 Vand L Rev 438 (1950).
184 See Department of Treasury v Fabe, 508 US 491, 516 (1993) (Kennedy dissenting)
("rule that exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be construed narrowly"), citing both
Union Labor Life Ins Co v Pireno, 458 US 118, 126 (1982) ("[Olur precedents consistently
hold that exemptions from the antitrust laws must be construed narrowly.") and Group
Life & Health Ins Co v Royal Drug Co, 440 US 204, 231 (1979) ("It is well settled that
exemptions from the antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed. This doctrine is not
limited to implicit exemptions from the antitrust laws, but applies with equal force to
express statutory exemptions."); Federal Maritime Commission v Seatrain Lines, Inc, 411
US 726, 733 (1973) (describing this principle as the Court's "frequently expressed view").
185 See Richard Posner, Statutory Interpretation-Inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U Chi L Rev 800, 806 (1983) ("[Mlost of the canons are just wrong.").
186 See HartfordFire Insurance Co v California, 509 US 764, 796 (1993) ("[I]t is well
established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States.") (collecting
cases and commentaries); id at 814 (Scalia dissenting) ("We have [ I found the presumption [against extraterritoriality] to be overcome with respect to our antitrust laws; it is
now well established that the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially.").
187 Eskridge and Frickey, Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv L Rev at 107 (cited in note
175) ("Rule against extraterritorial application of U.S. law, except for antitrust laws.").
For discussions of the antitrust laws' extraterritorial application, see generally Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations § 415 (1987); Waller, Antitrust and American Business
Abroad §§ 6:1-23 (cited in note 7); Herbert Hovenkamp, FederalAntitrust Policy: The Law
of Competition and Its Practice§ 21.2 at 699-707 (West 1994).
188 See American Banana Co v United Fruit Co, 213 US 347, 356-57 (1909) (using a
territorial rule of jurisdiction to hold that defendant's conduct was beyond the reach of
U.S. law).
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retreated from this foreign legality test.'8 9 Judge Learned Hand
clarified the matter in United States v Aluminum Company of
America ("Alcoa")19 ° by ruling that agreements made abroad in
restraint of trade violate the Sherman Act "if they were intended
to affect imports and did affect them."19' This effects test prevailed before the Supreme Court in the ensuing decades,19 2 and
Congress codified a version of the effects test in the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982.193

In line with their determination of extraterritoriality, the
courts have also determined that § 12 permits worldwide service
of process.194 Interestingly, however, it seems that few opinions
written before 1990 used the word "worldwide" in describing
§ 12,"95 preferring "nationwide" or the ambiguous "extraterrito-

189 See United States v Sisal Sales Corp, 274 US 268, 274-76 (1927) (holding that a
conspiracy entered into in the United States to monopolize sisal imports violated § 73 of
the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 USC § 8 (1994)). The Court distinguished American Banana as a
private action arising under what was then § 7 of the Sherman Act and involving injury
committed by a foreign government. Id. Lower courts now acknowledge that American
Banana is no longer good law. See Hunt v Mobil Oil Corp, 550 F2d 68, 74 (2d Cir 1977)
("American Banana is no longer a viable precedent."); Zenith Radio Corp v Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co, 494 F Supp 1161, 1184 (E D Pa 1980) ("American Banana'sjurisdictional implications are obsolete.").
190 United States v Aluminum Co ofAmerica, 148 F2d 416 (2d Cir 1945).

191 Id at 444.
See, for example, Hartford Fire Insurance Co v California, 509 US 764, 795-99
(1993) (holding liable domestic and foreign insurers that conspired in London to restrain
the insurance trade in the United States); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co v Zenith
Radio Corp, 475 US 574, 582 n 6 (1986); Continental Ore Co v Union Carbide, 370 US 690,
704 (1962) (noting that the Sherman Act reaches conspiracies abroad to monopolize or
restrain commerce of the United States).
193 See 15 USC § 6a(1) (1994) (requiring a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on commerce to invoke the Sherman Act). Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy § 21.2a at 701 (cited in note 187), provides the following summary:
192

[T]he requisite effect must be on one of the following:
(1) an American domestic market;
(2) a market for importing goods into the United States; or
(3) a market for exporting goods from the United States, but only if the
injury occurs to the exporting business within the United States.
194 See Go-Video, Inc v Akai Electric Co, Ltd, 885 F2d 1406, 1413 (9th Cir 1989) ("Clayton Act § 12... authorizes worldwide service of process."); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, 94 F Supp 2d 26, 27 n 3 (D DC 2000) ("Section 12 of the Clayton Act [ I allows for
worldwide service of process."); Dee-K Enterprises,Inc v Heveafil Sdn Bhd, 982 F Supp
1138, 1144 (E D Va 1997) ("Section 12 of the Clayton Act provides for nationwide-indeed
worldwide-service of process when the antitrust defendant is a corporation."); Icon Industrial Controls Corp v Cimetrix, Inc, 921 F Supp 375, 376 (W D La 1996) (describing
§ 12 as a "worldwide service of process provision").
195 One exception is Sportmart, Inc v Frisch, 537 F Supp 1254, 1256 (N D Ill 1982)
(describing § 12 as a "worldwide service of process provision").
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rial."19 s Earlier opinions tended to advert obliquely at best to
§ 12's implications for service abroad.197
The issue of extraterritoriality also arises when administrators interpret and enforce antitrust statutes.' The Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice have issued enforcement guidelines that contain expansive
views of antitrust's extraterritoriality.'9 9 The agencies defend the
2°°
effects test by noting that other countries are adopting it.
Both courts and agencies thus have given effect to the antitrust laws' expansive purpose20 1 by construing their jurisdiction
broadly. It therefore would be inconsistent for courts to construe
196 Ambiguous because there is no federal general incorporation law; therefore "extraterritorial" could mean either "worldwide" or merely "out-of-state."
197 See, for example, Hoffman Motors Corp v Alfa Romeo SpA, 244 F Supp 70, 79-80
(S D NY 1965) (stating, but neither holding nor providing citations for the proposition,
that there is "no reason to limit the provisions of [15 USC] § 22 so as to apply only to
service within the United States"); Petroleum FinancialCorp v Stone, 116 F Supp 426, 428
(S D NY 1953) ("By virtue of section 12 of the Clayton Act, there are no territorial limits
upon service of the corporate defendant in a private anti-trust action.") (citing cases that
related to domestic service only). But see Herbert Hovenkamp, Personal Jurisdictionand
Venue in Private Antitrust Actions in the Federal Courts: A Policy Analysis, 67 Iowa L Rev
485, 507 (1982) ("Section 12 of the Clayton Act provides for.. . worldwide service of process wherever the defendant may be found.").
198 The Sherman and Wilson Tariff Acts empower United States Attorneys to sue for
damages or injunctive relief. See 15 USC §§ 4, 9 (1994). If against corporations, such suits
fall under § 12 of the Clayton Act. See 15 USC § 22 (creating special venue for "any suit,
action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation").
199 See United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations 12 (1995) ("Anticompetitive conduct
that affects U.S. domestic or foreign commerce may violate the U.S. antitrust laws regardless of where such conduct occurs or the nationality of the parties involved.").
200 Id at 12 n 51 ("In a world in which economic transactions observe no boundaries,
international recognition of the 'effects doctrine' of jurisdiction has become more widespread."). See James F. Rill, Creating and Maintaining Competition in a Common Market:
The Futureof Antitrust in an Integrated World Economy, 1992 U Chi Legal F 263, 273-74
("[Clountries from Canada to Czechoslovakia now employ the 'effects' test in their antitrust statues and enforcement policies."). See also notes 272-73 and accompanying text.
201 See Carnation Co v Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 US 213, 218 (1966) ("We
have long recognized that the antitrust laws represent a fundamental national economic
policy."); Northern Pacific Railway Co v United States, 356 US 1, 4 (1958) (describing the
Sherman Act as a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty"); United States v SouthEastern UnderwritersAssn, 322 US 533, 558 (1944) ("That Congress wanted to go to the
utmost extent of its Constitutional power in restraining trust and monopoly agreements
...admits of little, if any, doubt. The purpose was to use that power to make of ours, so
far as Congress could under our dual system, a competitive business economy.") (citations
omitted); D.R. Wilder ManufacturingCo v Corn ProductsRefining Co, 236 US 165, 173-74
(1915) (noting that with the Sherman Act, Congress "intended in the most comprehensive
way to provide against combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce");
Laker Airways, 568 F Supp at 818 ("[Tlhe antitrust laws of the United States embody a
specific congressional purpose to encourage the bringing of private claims in the American
courts in order that the national policy against monopoly may be vindicated."). See also
note 166.

281]

FORUM NON CONVENENS AND ANTITRUST

309

§ 12 to permit forum non conveniens dismissal in international
antitrust cases." ' Courts have little textual, contextual, precedential, canonical, or administrative basis to dismiss cases in
favor of more convenient foreign fora, particularly since Congress
enacted § 12 in order to encourage enforcement.
4. The Gilbert factors revisited.
Given antitrust's settled extraterritoriality, courts should not
flout congressional policy to shorten an antitrust plaintiff's road
to the courthouse.0 3 In particular, courts should retrospectively
regard § 12 as a coherent legislative weighing of the public interest in antitrust enforcement against the convenience factors that
the Supreme Court later enumerated in Gilbert. °4 Recall that the
public interest factors include docket management, the need to
reduce the burden of jury service on a local community unrelated
to the case, the desire to hold a trial within view of those whose
affairs it touches, and the "local interest in having localized controversies decided at home."0 5
The last factor is hard for courts to apply in international antitrust: how to localize a controversy that stems from a possibly
international conspiracy with certainly international effects?
Courts and Congress have responded with the effects test: local
controversies include international antitrust suits that arise out
of conduct that affects American markets.2 6 This interpretation
may even expand on legislative intent expressed during debate on
the Clayton Act. Congressman Cullop argued that he wanted the
antitrust plaintiff "to sue at home in the jurisdiction where the
cause of action arose."2 7 Other members of the House specifically
stated their desire that plaintiffs sue where they sustained anti202 See National City Lines 1, 334 US at 588 ("[Jludicial discretion to apply the doctrine
of forum non conveniens so as to deprive the plaintiff of the choice given by [§ 12] ...
would be utterly inconsistent with the purpose of Congress in conferring the broader
range of choice.").
203 See National City Lines 1, 334 US at 587:

No one [in the House] suggested that the courts would have discretionary
power to decline to exercise the jurisdiction conferred. But since it was
universally agreed that the choice of venue, to whatever extent it might
be conferred, was to be given as a matter of right, several of the broader
amendments were opposed and defeated as going too far.
204

Gilbert, 330 US 501. For the factors, see text accompanying notes 21-24.

205

Id at 508-09.

206

See text accompanying notes 191-93.
51 Cong Rec 9416 (May 28, 1914).

207
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trust injuries.2"8 Under the Clayton Act and the effects test, then,
"home" may be where the hurt is-where allegedly anticompetitive behavior injured U.S. citizens (not necessarily the plaintiffs).
By firmer reasoning, if the effects test justifies jurisdiction,
then the case and the local community are not unrelated. Jurors
there have a stake in preventing antitrust injury to themselves,
and the case goes to trial in view of those it touches. An American
district may not be the place most affected by the alleged antitrust violation at issue; but Congress surely can inconvenience
the jury-serving public in order to advance antitrust enforcement.
Voters have political remedies ifjury duty overburdens them.
Consider also the private interest factors at stake in a forum
non conveniens determination: access to proof, availability of
compulsory process, the cost of obtaining witnesses, and "all other
practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive."2"9 Such practical problems existed in 1914 just as
today, yet the convenience of defendants lost out during debate
on the Clayton Act.210 Courts cannot ignore this judgment; they
must conform federal common law to the legislative will.21'
Even assuming that the legislative will was unclear at a time
of railroads and telegraphs,212 modern economies in transportation and communications21 render concern for the convenience of
foreign defendants or witnesses misplaced. In 1914, a private antitrust action in Los Angeles alleging a conspiracy in New York to
208

See note 45.

209

Gilbert,330 US at 508. The Court included as other possible private interest factors

"the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained," "advantages and obstacles to fair
trial," and whether the plaintiff, by choosing an inconvenient forum, is vexing or harassing the defendant. Id. One Gilbert factor is inapposite in antitrust: as opposed to a tort
case, for example, there is little need in an antitrust case for a jury to view any particular
location.
210 See National City Lines 1, 334 US at 582-87 (discussing the legislative history); id
at 586 (describing § 12 as "designed to aid plaintiffs by giving them a wider choice of venues and thereby to secure a more effective, because more convenient, enforcement of antitrust prohitibions") (emphasis added).
211 See id at 589 ("Our general power to supervise ... the federal courts does not extend to disregarding a validly enacted and applicable statute or permitting departure from
it, even in such matters as venue.") (citation omitted); City of Milwaukee v Illinois, 451 US
304, 313 (1981), quoting New Jersey v New York, 283 US 336, 348 (1931) ("We have always
recognized that federal common law is 'subject to the paramount authority of Congress.'").
212 A heroic assumption: see notes 31-54 and 157-68 and accompanying text.
213 See World Bank, World Development Report 1995: Workers in an IntegratingWorld,
fig 7.1 at 51 (Oxford 1995) (showing declines in prices of ocean freight, air transport revenues per mile, and transatlantic telephone calls). Even difficulties in translation have
become more susceptible to technological solution. Yet it is important to view twentiethcentury economies as improvements on revolutionary capabilities developed in the late
nineteenth century. See text accompanying notes 253-55.
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restrain trade nationwide would have posed logistical problems
greater than those posed by international litigation today. Yet
Congress then chose to ignore the transcontinental defendant's
inconvenience and to enable the plaintiff to sue at home.214 Intercontinental air travel, international legal representation, and
inexpensive international communications should assuage judges'
concerns for parties' convenience.2 1 Any party sued under § 12
and urging forum non conveniens dismissal must be either a U.S.
corporation or a foreign corporation that has enough wealth and
global reach to transact business or be present in the United
States216 and to create allegedly anticompetitive effects here.217
It would be strange indeed for courts now to show the solicitude for such defendants' convenience that Congress did not show
a century ago for at least American corporations' convenience,
unless courts' solicitude stems from considerations that have
nothing to do with convenience at all.

IV. DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC AND LEGAL EFFECTS
Proponents of forum non conveniens in antitrust make implicitly or explicitly three claims-about the international political system, the world economy and the American legal system.
These claims go beyond the question, which this Comment suggests Congress has answered, of how to treat individual antitrust
litigants fairly. The claims therefore deserve responses.
A. Forum Non Conveniens or Forum Non Pacificum?
Perhaps to minimize diplomatic repercussions from the global
reach of American antitrust law, several commentators have argued that forum non conveniens should apply in antitrust because it affords courts more complete analysis and greater flexibility than do the traditional legal principle of comity21 s and its
See note 45 (citing to floor discussion of transcontinental hypothetical).
See McGee v InternationalLife Insurance Co, 355 US 220, 223 (1957) ("[Miodern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to
defend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity."); Calvaro Growers of
California v GeneraliBelgium, 632 F2d 963, 969 (2d Cir 1980) (Newman concurring) ("Jet
travel and satellite communications have significantly altered the meaning of 'non conveniens.'").
216 In which case defending an antitrust case in a U.S. forum cannot be very inconvenient. See note 292.
217 See 15 USC § 22.
218 See M.D. Kresic, Note, The Inconvenient Forum and International Comity in Private Antitrust Actions, 52 Fordham L Rev 399, 405 (1983) ("[Florum non conveniens is the
214
215
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application in international antitrust, the jurisdictional rule of
reason. 2 9 These commentators seek to prevent diplomatic disputes over international antitrust litigation.22 ° However, their
diplomatic rationale twists forum non conveniens from a doctrine
that promotes fair and efficient judicial administration to one
that respects foreign sovereigns. Comity and the rule of reason
would promote this respect more effectively.
1. Comity and convenience.
Forum non conveniens differs markedly from comity (or the
rule of reason). In substance, forum non conveniens primarily
assesses an American forum's convenience to the court, the parties, and the jury-serving public; the inquiry also asks whether
evidence is available in the forum and whether the U.S. court can
easily administer the case.221 Comity and the rule of reason, by
contrast, incorporate conflict-of-laws principles and diplomatic
deference. At its core, comity urges that each sovereign recognize
and respect acts of other sovereigns. 2
Comity thus reins in international antitrust enforcement: the
FTC and the Antitrust Division bow to comity's requirement that
they take into account other nations' interests.2 23 Courts, too, acknowledge that comity circumscribes their jurisdiction. Comity
marked international antitrust jurisprudence most strongly in

most equitable way to assess both public policy and litigants' interests while addressing
the concerns of foreign nations.").
219 See, for example, Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 6:17 at 6-51-652 (cited in note 7) (terming forum non conveniens "a powerful addition, if not substitute,
for [sic] disputes over jurisdiction and comity"); id § 21:27 at 21-42-21-48 (stating that
forum non conveniens "holds forth considerable promise for use in foreign commerce antitrust litigation" because "litigation of jurisdictional questions would shift from the all or
nothing proposition of whether the United States has jurisdiction to whether the U.S. is
the best forum for resolution of the dispute"); J. Sandage, Note, Forum Non Conveniens
and the ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Antitrust Law, 94 Yale L J 1693,
1706 (1985) (terming the doctrine a "better response to the challenge of selecting cases
appropriate for United States jurisdiction").
220 For examples of such disputes, see Diane P. Wood, The Impossible Dream: Real
InternationalAntitrust, 1992 U Chi Legal F 277, 299 nn 91-93 (tracing transatlantic
repercussions of antitrust cases against the uranium, airline, and insurance industries).
221 For discussion of the Gilbert factors, see text accompanying notes 21-23.
222 See Hilton v Guyot, 159 US 113, 163-64 (1895) ("[Comity involves the] recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the
rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws.").
223 See Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines at 20 (cited in note 199) ("[I1n determining
whether to assert jurisdiction ... each Agency takes into account whether significant
interests of any foreign sovereign would be affected.").
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Timberlane Lumber Co v Bank of America,224 where the Ninth
Circuit applied conflict-of-laws and comity principles to develop
what it termed a "jurisdictional rule of reason"225 for antitrust.

Rather than assess the convenience of private parties involved in
the case, the rule of reason aimed to assess the interests of the
two nations that might assert jurisdiction, and to do so by
weighing several factors:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or
principal places of business of corporations, the extent to
which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on
the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the
extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and
the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct
abroad.226
There is very little overlap between these governmental interests
227
and the public and private interests enumerated in Gilbert.
The Restatement takes a slightly different view of the rule of
reason, terming it a rule of international law rather than a result
of comity analysis.2 But the jurisdictional result is the same: in
antitrust, the Restatement supplements territoriality229 with both
an intended-effects test23 ° derived from Alcoa231 and the rule of
reason for marginal cases.232

224

Timberlane Lumber Co v Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association,

549 F2d 597 (9th Cir 1976).
225 Id at 613, quoting Kingman Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad
446 (McGraw-Hill 1958).
226 Timberlane, 549 F2d at 614, citing Brewster, Antitrust and American Business
Abroad at 446 (cited in note 225), and Restatement (Second) [sic] of Foreign Relations § 40
(1965).
227 For the Gilbert factors, see text accompanying notes 21-24. Even the further factors
put forward in Reyno, 454 US at 241 n 6 (1981), do not overlap with the Timberlane analysis: although Reyno counsels avoiding conflicts of law, it seems to do so in the context of
promoting easy administration. See id (including as factors "familiarity with the law to be
enforced" and "avoidance of unnecessary conflicts of law and foreign law problems").
228 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 403 comment (a) (1987).
229 See id at § 415(1).
230 See id at § 415(2).
231 See text accompanying notes 189-93.
232 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations at § 415(3) (1987).
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Forum non conveniens and comity (or its antitrust corollary,
the jurisdictional rule of reason) are therefore fundamentally
separate inquiries that courts should keep distinct. Since the
Timberlane comity factors relate to sovereign interests,23 3 they
differ strikingly from the Gilbert forum non conveniens factors,234
which weigh the convenience of the U.S. forum to the parties, the
court, and the jury-serving public.
2. Comity as the better respecter of sovereigns.
Despite this distinction, several commentators who advocate
applying forum non conveniens do so not solely to enhance the
convenience of foreign defendants, but also to accommodate the
interests of foreign governments. 5 It is not clear why forum non
conveniens would do so more successfully than a Timberlanecomity analysis, unless screening for convenience would simply
have the effect of dismissing more cases and thus mollifying other
nations. But this approach misconstrues forum non conveniens,
while providing an ineffective tool for limiting extraterritoriality.
So to apply forum non conveniens would require that courts
weigh governmental interests again under an inaccurate rubric of
convenience. This weighing would not only confuse terminology
but would also stretch forum non conveniens beyond recognition
into a diplomatic device better termed forum non pacificum.23 6
Thus to use forum non conveniens would cast the doctrine loose
from its common-law moorings in the waters of convenience.
Advocating forum non conveniens as the best method by
which courts can screen out inappropriate suits also overlooks the
sequence of analysis courts must follow. Comity and the rule of
reason work to deprive a court of jurisdiction, while a forum non
conveniens motion asks a court to dismiss a case over which it
233

See Timberlane, 549 F2d at 614 (discussing even the nationalities of parties and

the "locations or principal places of business of corporations" in the context of the foreign
government's interest, despite their impact on expense to or convenience of corporate
defendants).
234 See text accompanying notes 21-24.
235 See Waller, Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 21:27 at 21-47 (cited in note
7) ("If another forum's interest is predominant, the case can be dismissed.... The interests of foreign parties and governments could be addressed [through forum non conveniens analysis]."); Kresic, 52 Fordham L Rev at 418 (cited in note 218) ("Forum non conveniens ... encompasses the requirement of comity within the framework of existing law. All
factors used in balancing public or national interests involved in an antitrust action under
Timberlane can be adequately weighed in a public interest analysis under forum non
conveniens.").
236 See P.G.W. Glare, ed, Oxford Latin Dictionary 1280 (Oxford 1990) (defining pacificus as "making or tending to make peace").
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has concluded that it has jurisdiction.237 A court can dismiss for
forum non conveniens only after it finds that it has both subjectmatter and personal jurisdiction and that venue is proper.238
Moreover, since choice of law affects the forum non conveniens
balancing, a court determines whether American or foreign law
applies before deciding whether to dismiss for forum non conveniens.23 9 This sequence of analysis makes forum non conveniens a
poor means by which to limit the extraterritoriality of U.S. law.
Comity and the rule of reason are better candidates for this
task because of their deep roots in international law and their
close connection with jurisdiction. In Hartford Fire Insurance Co
° both Justice Souter and Justice Scalia used comity
v California,24
principles to determine whether to apply American antitrust law
to reinsurers' conduct in London.241 The Justices disagreed, including on whether comity and the rule of reason deprived the
district court of jurisdiction or required the court not to exercise
it.242 But comity set the framework for both Justices' analysis.
Furthermore, as Justice Souter observed, Congress has recently
endorsed courts' use of comity in antitrust.24 3 No similar endorsement supports using forum non conveniens.
237 See Gilbert, 330 US at 504 ("[Tlhe doctrine of forum non conveniens can never
apply if there is an absence of jurisdiction."); Scott v Monsanto Co, 868 F2d 786 (5th Cir
1989) ("[Tlhe doctrine of forum non conveniens ... is not applicable if jurisdiction is lacking or venue is improper.").
238 See 15 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Edward H. Cooper, Federal
Practiceand Procedure § 3828 at 287 & n 30 (West 2d ed 1986) (collecting cases).
239 See In re McLelland Engineers,Inc, 742 F2d 837, 838 (5th Cir 1984) ("The first step
in any forum non conveniens analysis is a determination of which substantive law governs

the case."); Barry E. Hawk, I-A United States, Common Market, and InternationalAnti-

trust: A Comparative Guide 694 (Prentice Hall 2d ed 1993) (suggesting that using forum
non conveniens to "limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws... puts the
cart before the horse" because a court deciding a forum non conveniens motion has already
determined which country's law applies, and uses that determination in the Gilbert factor
analysis); Daniel J. Capra, Selecting an Appropriate Federal Court in an International
Antitrust Case:PersonalJurisdictionand Venue, 9 Fordham Intl L J 401, 478 (1986).
240 HartfordFire Insurance Co v California,509 US 764 (1993).
241 Id at 797-99 (Souter) (concluding that comity did not prohibit the district court
from exercising jurisdiction, because no true conflict with British law existed); id at 81421 (Scalia dissenting) (contending that international law, comity and the jurisdictional
rule of reason all required the lower court to dismiss for lack of prescriptive jurisdiction).
242 Comlpare id at 798 (Souter) (asking "whether a court with Sherman Act jurisdiction
should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international comity") with
id at 820 (Scalia) (terming erroneous the Court's choice "to make adjudicative jurisdiction
(or more precisely, abstention) the vehicle for taking account of the needs of prescriptive
comity" and describing the real issue as "whether the Sherman Act covers this conduct").
243 See Hartford Fire, 509 US at 798, quoting HR Rep No 97-686, 97th Cong, 2d Sess
13 (1982) (expressing the Judiciary Committee's intent that the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act "have no effect on the courts' ability to employ notions of comity").
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3. Courts as diplomats.
Not only do courts lack clear authority to apply forum non
conveniens in antitrust, but they also lack a scholarly consensus
on whether they should. Courts cannot forge international antitrust cooperation case by case. 244 And while some commentators
decry HartfordFire's extraterritoriality,2 45 others note that erring
on the side of territoriality may contribute to systemic underregulation.24 6 Some scholars believe that for U.S. courts unilaterally to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction will lead to more international antitrust cooperation by forcing the issue.247 On this
view, applying forum non conveniens is self-defeating. Deciding
when other nations have sufficiently caught up with American
antitrust law, therefore, is a judgment for the political branches
to make, either by clarifying that forum non conveniens does apply or by ratifying treaties limiting private enforcement of American antitrust law.24 Given the congressional policy outlined
above, even assuming that private antitrust enforcement wreaks
diplomatic havoc, it cannot be the case that courts may on this
basis depart from the text of the Clayton Act in order to still
troubled international waters. Surely the political branches must
make such an amendment, and thus far they have not.249
244

See William S. Dodge, Extraterritorialityand Conflict-of-Laws Theory, 39 Harv Intl

L J 101, 159-63 (1998).
245 See id at 160 & 163-64 (collecting authorities).
246 See id at 153-58.
247 See id at 164 & n 356; Russell J. Weintraub, The ExtraterritorialApplication of
Antitrust and Securities Laws: An Inquiry into the Utility of a "Choie-of-Law"Approach,
70 Tex L Rev 1799, 1817, 1825-27 (1992) (contending that reasonable enforcement of
antitrust laws will lead to international cooperation).
248 History cautions that Congress can be jealous of its jurisdiction over international
antitrust, and leery of limitations on it. See Wood, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 284 (cited in
note 220) (describing the 1940s Congress as "not ready to cede any antitrust jurisdiction").
249 See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1985, S 374, 99th Cong, 1st Sess
(Feb 6, 1985) in 131 Cong Rec 1161 (statement of Senator DeConcini) (proposing in § 4 to
legislate forum non conveniens for antitrust). In the two subsequent Congresses, but not
thereafter, Senator DeConcini introduced similar bills, sections 104 of which would have
affirmed the applicability of forum non conveniens. See S 572, 100th Cong, 1st Sess (Feb
19, 1987), reprinted with legislative analysis at 133 Cong Rec 3789-93; id at 3789 (statement of Senator DeConcini) ("The United States is no longer in a position where it can
dictate the rules for international business transactions. We must seek to harmonize our
policies and laws with those of our trading partners if we are to successfully compete for
world markets."); S 50, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 25, 1989), reprinted with statement and
analysis at 135 Cong Rec 632-35. According to the latter statement, the purpose of § 104
was to "limit 'forum shopping' by antitrust plaintiffs and help to minimize litigation burdens on parties and witnesses." Id at 635. The bill's chief purpose, however, was to codify a
jurisdictional rule of reason and specify factors for courts to balance in applying that rule.
Id at 633. None of these bills passed the Senate.
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B. Economic Globalization in Historical Context
Why has Congress not legislated forum non conveniens in antitrust? One immediately reaches for public choice explanations,
but interest group analysis only gets so far. Certainly foreign antitrust defendants are unlikely to organize, and even if organized
are unlikely to succeed in pressuring Congress to act. But forum
non conveniens of course rescues American multinationals too
from treble damages and U.S. discovery rules; such firms stand a
much higher chance than their foreign counterparts of convincing
Congress to act, but have not succeeded.
Perhaps we can best explain congressional inaction by understanding the rationale behind § 12 to have been reinforced, not
undermined, by economic and technological change. That understanding would contradict Howe,2 5 where Justice Breyer suggested that increased economic interdependence justified using
forum non conveniens in the face of special venue statutes. 251 He
implied that Congress did not foresee global commerce giving rise
to spirited litigation among multinational firms.252 His argument,
however, assumes in part that globalization today is unprecedented. History suggests the contrary.
It is true that since World War II the United States has progressively integrated into world markets. Imports and exports
totaled barely 8 percent of gross domestic product in 1959 but
over 27 percent of the American economy in 1997.25 Yet viewed
properly, this increase represents a reintegration. Foreign trade
accounted for 16 percent of national income in 1879, 13.9 percent
in 1889, 11.2 percent in 1909, and 18.4 percent in 1919.254 Two
250

946 F2d 944.

251

Id at 950 ("The growing interdependence of formerly separate national economies,

the increased extent to which commerce is international, and the greater likelihood that
an act performed in one country will affect citizens of another, all argue for expanded
efforts to help the world's legal systems work together, in harmony, rather than at cross
purposes."). See also Kenneth W. Dam, Extraterritorialityin an Age of Globalization:The
Hartford Fire Case, 1993 S Ct Rev 289, 290-92 (showing growing international economic
interdependence since World War II).
252 See text accompanying note 287.
253 See Economic Report of the President:Transmitted to the Congress February 1998
table B-2 (GPO 1998). In 1959, imports ($106.6 billion) and exports ($71.9 billion) were
8.03 percent of the gross domestic product ($2.22 trillion). In 1997, exports totaled $922.7
billion, imports $1,048.9 billion, and the gross domestic product $7.1 trillion; the international sector's share of the gross domestic product had thus risen to 27.8 percent. See also
Dam, 1993 S Ct Rev at 291-92 (cited in note 251) (giving figures for post-war growth in
dependence on international trade and in private foreign investment).
254 Karl W. Deutsch and Alexander Eckstein, National Industrializationand the Declining Share of the InternationalEconomic Sector, 1890-1959, 13 World Politics 267, 281
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World Wars, the Depression, and the Cold War caused a twentieth-century retrenchment in international economic integration
and mask how greatly the world economy of 1914 resembled that
of today."' U.S. antitrust law began amid rampant globalization.
Proponents of the Sherman Act aimed it at foreign commerce
as much as at domestic commerce, particularly since the federal
government's revenue depended on imports.25 Senator Sherman
defended his bill against the charge that conspirators in restraint
of trade would simply decamp to Canada or Mexico, and make
their pacts there, by noting that "if an unlawful combination is
made outside of the United States and in pursuance of it property

(Jan 1961), citing Bureau of the Census data. See also Paul Krugman, Pop Internationalism 207-08 (MIT 1996) ("It is a late 20th-century conceit that we invented the global
economy just yesterday.... Chicago [in] 1894 was arguably as much a part of a global
market as Los Angeles today.... It is a little-known but startling fact that world trade as
a share of world production did not return to its 1913 level until about 1970.").
255 See Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, Globalization and History: The
Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy 30 (MIT 1999) (showing that US
merchandise exports rose as a percentage of GDP from 4.1 percent in 1913 to just 6.3
percent in 1987, hardly an epochal shift); id at 207 ("The late nineteenth century saw
international capital flows larger in scale than anything seen before or since."); id at 213
("Since 1972, a global capital market has tried to regain what it had achieved in 1913....
[The current account's share of GDP, across fourteen industrial economies,] is still only
half of what it was in the late 1880s."); id at 217 ('[TIhe modern [multinational corporation] did emerge in the decades prior to World War I, and it played a more important role
in the pre-1914 era than is commonly assumed. Indeed, the stock of U.S. investment
abroad amounted to $2.65 billion in 1914, or 7 percent of GNP."). Generally, O'Rourke and
Williamson argue that the railroad, steamship, telegraph, and undersea cable sparked
true globalization, and that contemporary technology has caused a more incremental
knitting together of the global economy. They note that the British merchant banking firm
Barings, which went broke in 1995, had also collapsed in 1890 (because of bad loans to
Argentina), and that both Argentina and Brazil experienced debt crises in the 1890s as
well as the 1980s. Id at 207.
256 See 21 Cong Rec 2456 (Mar 21, 1890) (statement of Senator Sherman) ("Unlawful
combinations... interfere with our foreign and domestic commerce and with the importation and sale of goods subject to duty under the laws of the United States ....They not
only affect our commerce with other nations, but trade and transportation among the
several States."); id at 2457 ("This bill ...has for its single object . . . to deal with the

combinations ...when they affect injuriously our foreign and interstate commerce and
our revenue laws."); id at 2460 ("[Now the people of the United States as well as of other
countries are feeling the power and grasp of these combinations.... Vast combinations to
control production and trade and to break down competition... are imported from abroad.
Congress alone can deal with them."); id ("[O]nly the General Government can deal with
combinations reaching not only the several States, but the commercial world."). A leading
antitrust practitioner described Senator Sherman's speech of March 21, 1890, as "his most
important speech in support of his bill." Kintner, 1 Legislative History at 18 (cited in note
33). Senator Sherman sat on the Senate Finance Committee-the Senate committee with
jurisdiction over tariffs-and it was the Finance Committee that reported his bill in both
the 50th Congress, see 20 Cong Rec 1120 (Jan 23, 1889), and the 51st Congress, see 21
Cong Rec 2455 (Mar 21, 1890).
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is brought within the United States such property is subject to
our laws" and "may be seized."25 7
Senator Sherman's concern was entirely realistic. Before
World War I, which mooted international antitrust enforcement,
many American businesses made international arrangements to
restrain competition.25 8 These included several agreements that
carved up world markets among U.S. and European suppliers.259

21 Cong Rec 2461 (Mar 21, 1890).
Mira Wilkins, The Emergence of Multinational Enterprise: American Business
Abroad from the Colonial Era to 1914 76 (Harvard 1970) ("[M]any American businesses
(as they exported, entered into foreign licensing arrangements, and made foreign investments) joined with others, especially Europeans, in restrictive international agreements."). The "first American international business" was the Singer sewing-machine
firm, id at 37, which in 1874 sold more than half of its sewing machines abroad, id at 43.
Many U.S. industries developed internationally in the late nineteenth century. See, for
example, id at 45 (metal manufacturing); id at 48 (telegraph); id at 49-51 (telephone); id
at 59-62 (chemicals); id at 62-64 (oil); id at 64-65 (insurance). In 1899, New York Life's
stationery bragged that the company was "The Oldest International Life Insurance Company in the World. Supervised by 82 Governments." Id at 71. Europeans first spoke of an
"invasion" of American manufactures at the turn of the century. Id at 70.
For a list of forty-one U.S. multinational firms that by 1914 had at least two production facilities abroad-firms including Coca-Cola, Heinz, Sherwin-Williams, Du Pont,
Ford, General Electric, National Cash Register, Alcoa, Gillette, and Eastman Kodak-see
Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand: The ManagerialRevolution in American Business 368
(Belknap 1977). Chandler viewed a "national or international marketing and distribution
network" as one of the three prerequisites for a modern industrial enterprise. Alfred
Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of IndustrialCapitalism8 (Belknap 1990).
259 The Clayton Act Congress would have been aware that in three major industries,
dominant U.S. firms and their European counterparts agreed that U.S. firms would not
market in Europe and vice versa. In 1897, responding to a foreign manufacturer building
a plant in New Jersey, representatives of ten U.S. explosives manufacturers traveled to
Europe and negotiated a division of markets with the Vereinigte Koln-Rottweiler Pulverfabriken of Cologne and the Nobel-Dynamite Trust Company of London. See William S.
Stevens, ed, Industrial Combinations and Trusts 160-61 (MacMillan 1913) (recounting
the incident); id at 176-83 (reprinting the agreement). In 1901 the American Tobacco
Company bought one British tobacco firm, which so alarmed thirteen other British tobacco
manufacturers that they combined into the Imperial Tobacco Company. See id at 160
(describing the events). Then these two national tobacco trusts divvied up spheres of operation. See id at 161-67 (reprinting their contract). In 1908 Alcoa and the largest European aluminum manufacturer, the Neuhausen Company of Switzerland, allocated shares
of the European, U.S., and common markets. Id at 183-84 (reprinting the agreement).
International cartels existed in other industries before 1914. See Ervin Hexner,
InternationalCartels 206 (North Carolina 1945) ("Even before World War I there were
international steel cartels ...between American and European countries."); J. Morgan
Rees, Trusts in British Industry, 1914-1921 22 (King 1922) (noting that in 1904 the
American Steel Rail Makers joined the international association of rail makers, already
composed of British, German, and Belgian firms, and agreed on a division of markets in
Canada and Newfoundland). The American meat trust grew so large that by around 1900
it alone accounted for "about 50 per cent" of Britain's frozen meat supplies and threatened
to control Australia's beef exports. Alfred Plummer, International Combines in Modern
Industry 137-39 (Pitman 3d ed 1951). "Before 1914 the International Quinine Agreement
divided up 'territories' amongst the American, British, Dutch, French, and German companies who were members of the combine." Id at 16.
257
258
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It is therefore no wonder that foreign defendants featured prominently in early antitrust cases 2 ° and that Congress salted a tariff
bill with antitrust provisions.26 1
As this history suggests, "globalization" refers to at least two
different things. It can mean greater economic integration-a
higher likelihood that any given transaction will be transnational. Or it can refer to technological progress that facilitates
integration. Such progress has prevented defending an antitrust
case over long distance from being more burdensome than it was
in 1914.262 But the likelihood of a transaction today being transnational is not exponentially greater than it was a century ago.
The shipping industry embarked on many international restraints of trade. Just
before 1914, there were eighty international shipping cartel agreements. See Robert
Liefinann, Cartels, Concerns and Trusts 150 (Methuen 1932). A decade earlier, J.P.
Morgan had attempted to take over British shippers. See Tony Freyer, Regulating Big
Business: Antitrust in Great Britain and America, 1880-1990 106 (Cambridge 1992). Con-

gress targeted shipping cartels by closing the Panama Canal to any ship "permitted to
engage in the coastwise or foreign trade of the United States . . .if such ship is owned,
chartered, operated, or controlled by any person or company" that has violated antitrust
laws. Panama Canal Act, ch 390 § 11, 37 Stat 567 (1912), codified at 15 USC § 31 (1994).
An opponent of this ban argued, to no avail, that it would affect foreign shipping firms.
See 48 Cong Rec 11059 (Aug 16, 1912) (colloquy of Senators Reed and Brandegee) (noting
that the provision had expanded in conference to cover foreign-owned ships); id at 11061
(statement of Senator Brandegee) ("We ought not to attempt to dictate .. to the people of
foreign nations how their ships should be owned, in what proportion, or by whom.").
260 See United States v American Tobacco Co, 221 US 106, 171-72, 185 (1911) (reversing dismissal of Sherman Act suit as against the Imperial Tobacco Company of Great
Britain and Ireland and the British-American Tobacco Company); Standard Oil Co of New
Jersey v United States, 221 US 1, 81-82 (1911) (affirming judgment in part against a
British defendant, Anglo-American Oil Company, Ltd); United States v E. du Pont de
Nemours & Co, 188 F 127, 132-33 (C C D Del 1911) (dismissing Sherman Act suit against
American E.C. & Schultze Gunpowder Company, a British corporation); United States v
Virginia-CarolinaChemical Company, 1 D & J 689, 690 (M D Ten 1908) (dismissing, on

district attorney's motion, indictment against "the Goulding Fertilizer Company, of Great
Britain and Ireland"); United States v Shotter Co, 1 D & J 707 (SD Ga 1907) (noting that
defendant Socidt6 Anonyme des Produits R6sineaux pled guilty). See also the shipping
cases discussed in notes 167-68. Two other early cases seem to have involved foreign
defendants: see United States v Mead, 1 D & J 637, 637 (SD NY 1917) (listing as defendants Abitibi Power & Paper Co, Ltd, Belgo-Canadian Pulp & Paper Co, Ltd, Canada
Paper Co, Ltd, and Laurentide Co, Ltd); United States v American Thread Co, 1 D & J
449, 449-50 (D NJ 1914) (listing as defendants The American Thread Company; The
Thread Agency; English Sewing Cotton Company, Limited; Jonas Brooks & Brothers,
Limited; James Chadwick & Brother, Limited; and Sir Thomas Glen-Coats, Baronet).
261 See Wilson Tariff Act, ch 349 § 73, 28 Stat 509 (1894), codified at 15 USC § 8 (imposing criminal penalties on "every person who shall be engaged in the importation of
goods or any commodity from any foreign country" and restrains trade in imports "from
any foreign country into the United States"). The Senate accepted this provision as an
amendment to a tariff bill after one senator argued that "under every tariff which has ever
existed in the United States ...opportunity exists ...

for the creation of trusts; ...

it is

absolutely inseparable from tariff legislation that opportunity should be furnished for the
creation of combinations to regulate importations, with a view to increase the price of
certain commodities." 26 Cong Rec 7118 (July 3, 1894) (statement of Senator Morgan).
262 See notes 213-15 and 253-55 and accompanying text.
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To argue from supposed American insularity around 1900 that
Congress cannot have intended plaintiffs to bring antitrust actions against foreign corporations is to mistake economic history.
C. Consequences for American Law
Rather than focus on our economic past, some proponents of
forum non conveniens concentrate on our legal future. They wonder what international antitrust will look like without forum non
conveniens. They claim that the doctrine's absence will have
negative consequences for both U.S. courts and U.S. law.
1. Controlling dockets.
Underneath the private and public interests of forum non
conveniens doctrine lies the pragmatic reality that it enables
American courts to control their dockets by dismissing cases that
plaintiffs could bring abroad." 3 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit's position, by depriving courts of a tool to manage their caseloads, will
inevitably increase burdens on courts and on jury-serving citizens. This much is clear.
Less clear, however, is the magnitude of this burden shift.
Forum non conveniens operates only at the margin of convenience, since "there is ordinarily a strong presumption in favor of.
the plaintiff's choice of forum."264 Furthermore, the multivariate
nature of the forum non conveniens interest-balancing approach
creates uncertainty, rather than a bright-line deterrent. One can
only speculate as to how much antitrust litigation this uncertainty may chill.265 Since the Second Circuit itself has determined
that it may decide forum non conveniens motions on affidavits
263

See, for example, Bell v British Telecom, 1995 WL 476684, *3 (S D NY) (stating that

"[t]he courts in this District, already laden with litigation," have no interest in resolving
the action); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Non Conveniens-Who Needs it? [sic], in Michele
Taruffo, ed, Abuse of ProceduralRights: Comparative Standards of ProceduralFairness
351, 365 (Kluwer 1999) (stating that federal courts tend to dismiss "to clear their dockets"); Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74
Calif L Rev 1259 (1986) (terming forum non conveniens "a welcome discretionary method"
of docket control); Bies, Comment, 67 U Chi L Rev at 490 n 5 (cited in note 16) (collecting
authorities).
264 Reyno, 454 US at 255 (1981); Wright et al, 15 Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 3828 at 291-92 (cited in note 238) (collecting cases). The presumption is less strong
when the plaintiff is not an American citizen. See id § 3828 at 292 & n 40 (collecting
cases). This discrimination has been criticized. See Juenger, Forum Non Conveniens at
365 (cited in note 263).
265 See American Dredging Co v Miller, 510 US 443, 455 (1994) ("[Fiorum non conveniens cannot really be relied upon in making decisions about secondary conduct-in deciding, for example, where to sue or where to be sued.") (Scalia).
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alone,266 the cost of litigating up to a forum non conveniens dismissal is relatively low. Therefore, it is not clear that ruling out
forum non conveniens will lead to many more suits.
Capital Currency Exchange26" exemplifies this uncertainty. In
the district court, the banks moved to dismiss for both forum non
conveniens and failure to state a claim.268 The district court completely avoided the conflict between forum non conveniens and
§ 12 by noting that "[plaintiffs] do not assert section 12 as a basis
of venue in the complaint."269 To the district court, this made forum non conveniens dismissal easy. However, the Second Circuit's opinion suggests that the court of appeals also would have
affirmed a dismissal for either failure to state a claim or want of
subject matter jurisdiction. The Second Circuit regarded the case
as arising out of allegedly anticompetitive conduct abroad that
did not implicate U.S. interests. 7 ° The court even described the
plaintiffs' attempt "to morphose this case in case into a dispute
that concerns the United States" as a "red herring."27 ' On this
view, it seems likely that either alternative dismissal would have
met the Southern District's need for docket control just as well as
the forum non conveniens dismissal did. Whether the Southern
District needed to resort to forum non conveniens is unclear.
Also unclear is whether U.S. courts need fear a tsunami of
antitrust suits striking our shores given that other nations' antitrust standards are approaching our own. For example, the European Court of Justice has held that Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
and the principle of territoriality permit the European Commission to enforce the Treaty's antitrust provisions against defendants who agreed outside of the Community to sell wood pulp at
fixed prices to customers inside the Community. 72 Judge Wood

See Alcoa Steamship Co v MI VNordic Regent, 654 F2d 147, 149 (2d Cir 1980).
Capital CurrencyExchange, 155 F3d 603.
268 Capital CurrencyExchange, petition for cert at 19a (cited in note 3).
269 Id. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit stated blithely that the district court "found
that [I antitrust suits are subject to the forum non conveniens doctrine." Capital Currency
Exchange, 155 F3d at 606.
270 Capital CurrencyExchange, 155 F3d at 612. See note 5 and accompanying text.
271 Id.
272 See A. Alstr6m Osakeyhti6 v Commission, 1988 ECR 5193, 5242-44 (holding implementation within the common market of a pricing agreement made without the common market subject to Article 85, now Article 81, of the EEC Treaty); id at 5212 (summarizing, in the report for the hearing, the Commission's belief that "what is important from
the point of view of jurisdiction is where the conduct of the parties which it is the object, or
effect of the agreement to influence occurred and not the place where the agreement was
made"); id at 5220-24 (summarizing, in the opinion of the Advocate General, U.S. juris266
267
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has concluded that as a result, "the reach of27European
law is now
3
almost coexistent with its U.S. counterpart."

Extraterritorial jurisdiction over antitrust violations does
private plaintiffs no good if they cannot sue. But the European
Court of Justice has recently clarified that the EEC Treaty's competition provisions create a private right of action.274 By elaborating "doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, national remedies,
and the Community remedy principle," the European Court of
Justice has laid the theoretical groundwork for private antitrust
enforcement in Europe: "private antitrust actions for damages
under Community antitrust law are required to be available in
the national courts"275 of Community members.
Other developments have further decreased plaintiffs' incentives to sue in the United States. In response to the extraterritoriality of U.S. antitrust law, the United Kingdom has enacted a
"clawback" statute that deprives plaintiffs of the punitive twothirds of any threefold damages won in a Clayton Act suit.276 Several governments have enacted "blocking" statutes that limit the
ability of their citizens to obey U.S. discovery rules.277 Clawback
and blocking statutes reduce the foreign plaintiff's incentive to
forum-shop; they therefore tend to obviate concerns that depriving U.S. courts of forum non conveniens will leave them vulnerable to strategic antitrust suits by foreign plaintiffs.
In describing how American courts attract foreign plaintiffs,
courts and commentators often repeat Lord Denning's inapt analogy to lights attracting moths.278 With respect to international
antitrust litigation, however, the lights may be growing dim.
prudence on antitrust extraterritoriality and discussing Alcoa, Timberlane, and Mannington Mills, Inc v Congoleum Corp, 595 F2d 1287 (3d Cir 1979)).
273 See Wood, 1992 U Chi Legal F at 301 (cited in note 220); Dodge, 39 Harv Intl L J at
155 (cited in note 244) (stating that the European Court of Justice's view of antitrust
jurisdiction in Wood Pulp was "almost identical to Justice Souter's approach in Hartford").
274 See Gugrin Automobiles v Commission, 1997 ECR 1-1503, 1543 ("[Any undertaking
which considers that it has suffered damage as a result of restrictive practices may rely
... on the rights conferred on it by Article 85(1) and Article 86 [now Articles 81 and 82] of
the Treaty, which produce direct effect in relations between individuals.").
275 Clifford A. Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA,
246 (Oxford 1999). See also id at ix ("[It is certain that there will be much more private
enforcement of Community antitrust law than there has been in the past.").
276 Dodge, 39 Harv Intl L J at 164-65 (cited in note 244).
277 Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations § 443 rep n 4 (1987) (collecting blocking
statutes passed by Britain, Germany, France, Norway, Belgium, Sweden, Australia, and
South Africa in response to extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust law).
278 Smith Kline & French LaboratoriesLtd v Block, [1983] WLR 730, 733, [1983] 2 All
E R 72 ("As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States."). See
also Reyno, 454 US at 252 n 18 (listing reasons why U.S. courts attract foreign plaintiffs).
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2. Distinguishing special venue provisions.
Critics of the Fifth Circuit's decision in Mitsui27 9 note that
§ 12 is one of hundreds of special venue provisions in federal
law."' They therefore wonder what will be the effect of interpreting § 12 to rule out forum non conveniens. Does barring forum non conveniens in antitrust require barring it wherever special venue may lie?
Simply put, no. While courts do not always agree on which
statutes rule out forum non conveniens, the Fifth Circuit itself
has delineated statutes that bar the doctrine from statutes that
permit it. For example, the Fifth Circuit, despite Mitsui,2 agrees
with the Second Circuit's view that forum non conveniens is
available to tort defendants despite applicable special venue provisions.2 2 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit and the Second Circuit
agree that forum non conveniens applies in RICO litigation, special venue notwithstanding.2 3
Similarly, the First Circuit distinguished special venue provisions in Howe, a securities case.28 4 There, the plaintiff sued a
Canadian corporation, which moved for forum non conveniens
dismissal. 2 5 On appeal, then-Chief Judge Breyer termed "thoroughly unsound" the notion that every special venue provision on
the statute books barred forum non conveniens dismissals.2 8 He
argued that this notion would create a
hodge-podge, that would, or would not, bring about American adjudication of an essentially foreign controversy, deMitsui, 671 F2d 876.
For the statistic, see Wright et al, 15 FederalPracticeand Procedure§ 3804 at 28 &
n 2 (cited in note 238), citing American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction
between State and Federal Courts, Official Draft, 1969, Appendix F, 498-501, as listing
330 special venue provisions outside of Title 28 of the United States Code. That study
recommended changes to the federal venue statute, and in light of the proposed change,
suggested that "many special venue provisions are a needless duplication and could for
that reason be repealed." ALI, Study of the Division of JurisdictionAppendix F at 498.
However, Congress never enacted the proposed venue reform. Id at 9.
281 Mitsui, 671 F2d at 890-91.
282 Compare In re Aircrash DisasterNear New Orleans,Louisiana on July 9, 1982, 821
F2d 1147, 1163 n 25 (5th Cir 1987) (recognizing that forum non conveniens applies in
Jones Act context) with Cruz, 702 F2d at 47-48 (same).
283 Compare Kempe, 876 F2d at 1144 (holding that RICO special venue provision does
not obviate forum non conveniens) with Transunion, 811 F2d at 130 (same).
284 Howe, 946 F2d 944.
285 See id at 950 (holding that the trial court could invoke forum non conveniens and
279
280

decline to exercise jurisdiction).
286 Id.
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pending upon the pure happenstance of whether Congress-at some perhaps distant period and likely out of a
desire to widen plaintiffs' venue choices in typical domestic cases-enacted a "special venue" provision.2 87
Strikingly, however, Justice Breyer shielded antitrust from this
analysis, suggesting that the Clayton Act's unique legislative history meant that § 12 had more force than most other special
venue provisions, which forum non conveniens overrode."' Congressional policy has also enabled the Supreme Court to distinguish between antitrust and other areas of law in applying the
presumption against extraterritoriality.28 9
The Second Circuit too has recently drawn a similar line in
reversing a forum non conveniens dismissal of a case arising out
of torture in Nigeria. That case, Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co,29 turned on two statutes that the court read as expressing a
"policy of U.S. law favoring the adjudication of such suits in U.S.
courts." 9' While the Wiwa court did not bar forum non conveniens from such torture cases, it did hold that the lower court erred
as a matter of law by ignoring congressional policy when weighing the Gilbert factors.2 92
Clearly, then, legislative history and congressional policy enable courts to distinguish areas of law and determine whether
defendants may resort to forum non conveniens. Special venue
287

Id.

288

Howe, 946 F2d at 948-50.

289 See Dam, 1993 S Ct Rev at 289 (cited in note 251) (noting that just before deciding
to apply antitrust law extraterritorially, HartfordFire, 509 US at 796, the Court declined
so to apply immigration law, and had earlier declined so to apply civil rights provisions).
290

Wiwa v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 226 F3d 88 (2d Cir 2000).

Id at 106. The two statutes were the Alien Tort Claims Act, 62 Stat 934 (1948),
codified at 28 USC § 1350 (1994), which the Wiwa court noted had no formal legislative
history at all, Wiwa, 226 F3d at 104 n 10, and the Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"),
Pub L No 102-256, 106 Stat 73 (1992), codified at 28 USC § 1350 Appendix (1994). The
latter's text and history swayed the Wiwa court. Wiwa, 228 F3d at 106 ("The statute has
[I communicated a policy that such suits should not be facilely dismissed on the assumption that the ostensibly foreign controversy is not our business.").
292 Wiwa, 226 F3d at 106 ("[Ihe [district] court failed to count in favor of retention the
interest of the United States, as expressed in the TVPA, in providing a forum for the adjudication of claims of torture."). The lower court also erred in gauging the inconvenience
that litigation in the United States would cause the defendant: the issue in Wiwa did not
require view of premises; nor did presenting the case require the defendant to transport
substantial physical evidence other than documents; nor was this expense, combined with
that of transporting witnesses, "excessively burdensome" in view of the "vast resources" of
the defendant, a multinational corporation. Id at 107. These three practical considerations
hold true in suits under § 12 as well, but the Wiwa court did not discuss any tension with
the Second Circuit's view of forum non conveniens in antitrust.
291
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statutes do not stand or fall together. Therefore there is little
danger of courts losing control over the principle that Congress
may legislatively bar forum non conveniens.
CONCLUSION

This Comment has shown that the text, structure, interpretation, and history of the antitrust laws in general, and of § 12 of
the Clayton Act in particular, bar courts from using forum non
conveniens to dismiss international antitrust suits. Regardless of
courts' desires to control their dockets, deter forum-shopping, and
fend off cases that seem tenuously connected to the United
States, Congress has required the judiciary to afford foreign antitrust plaintiffs generous venue treatment.
Therefore, the federal courts should not reach for a commonlaw doctrine to frustrate congressional policy. 293 It is antidemocratic for courts to deploy a common-law doctrine to dismiss cases
arising out of statutory causes of action and satisfying special
venue provisions.294 Rather, courts should retrospectively regard
§ 12 as a coherent response to concentration and integration in
the global economy before World War I. The alternative-using
forum non conveniens to respect sovereigns-would change the
doctrine beyond recognition.
Someday Congress may determine that the international antitrust regime has developed sufficiently to justify amending § 12.
But Congress and the Executive Branch are far better observers
of the dynamic international antitrust scene than are the federal
courts. Judges should therefore leave this decision to the political
branches.

293 Whether because of docket pressures or because of its exposure to international
cases, the Second Circuit has worked in other ways to move cases offshore. Its willingness
to honor forum selection clauses is an example, as the court itself has noted. See Alcoa
Steamship Co v M/V Nordic Regent, 654 F2d 147, 158 (2d Cir 1981) ("In the [ area of
enforcement of contractual choice of forum clauses which resulted in sending an American
plaintiff to a foreign tribunal, this Court was a leader in the federal courts' movement
away from the earlier parochial view that such clauses should not be honored.").
294 See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation9-14 (Princeton 1997). Scalia describes an "uncomfortable relationship of common-law lawmaking to democracy," id at 10,
and notes the success of the nineteenth-century codification reformers in civil procedure,
id at 11. "[A]ttacking the enterprise [of statutory interpretation] with the Mr. Fix-it mentality of the common-law judge is a sure recipe for incompetence and usurpation." Id at 14.

